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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this dissertation, we analyze the nature of the long-run relationships that exist in
innitely repeated games. Many economic phenomena contain long-run relationships.
We focus on two kinds of long-run relationships. One is the relationship between
a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players. Consider a rm (a long-run
player) and consumers (short-run players). A potential consumer who are considering
to buy a product from a rm, acquires information about the quality of the product
from past consumers. In such a situation, the past consumers' behavior aects future
consumers' behavior and the rm's behavior. Thus, a rm and a sequence of consumers
have a long-run relationship. The other is the relationship among multiple long-run
players. Consider a team production in an organization. In most cases, the team
produces products repeatedly with the same team members (long-run players). Thus,
team members have long-run relationships.
In most studies that analyze long-run relationships in game theory, it is assumed
that each player can store all information at no cost. We call these kinds of models
unlimited memory models. However, unlimited memory models are unsuitable for
studying some long-run relationships.
Imagine a restaurant and a (potential) consumer who is considering whether to
go to the restaurant or not. Consumers acquire information about the restaurant
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from a guidebook. The consumer might not be able to acquire all the information
about the restaurant from the guidebook. In general, a guidebook covers information
about the current restaurant, however, it does not cover old information about the
restaurant. In such case, old information about the restaurant is no longer available.
In such situation, it may be plausible to assume that each player can store information
only in the xed number of previous periods. We call these kinds of models limited
memory models. Limited memory models are more suitable for analyzing those long-
run relationships than are unlimited memory models.
If information acquisition is costly, then players might not acquire information
when he believes that he cannot obtain protable information from costly information
acquisition. Consider the following team production. A team member cannot observe
other team members' behavior in a dierent division. However, if he incurs a cost and
goes to the other team members' division, he can observe the behavior of the other
team members. If the member believes strongly that other members choose a specic
action prole, then he does not monitor the action prole and saves on the monitoring
cost.
In this situation, it may be plausible to assume that each player can acquire the
information if he pays the monitoring cost. We call these kinds of models costly
observation models. These models are more suitable for studying long-run relationships
than are unlimited memory models.
In this dissertation, we consider three models: unlimited memory models, limited
memory models, and costly observation models. In what follows, we explain the results
for each model.
First, we analyze unlimited memory models. We consider a reputation model, that
is, a repeated game with a long-run player who has a type and a sequence of short-
run players. Previous studies show the partial property of the equilibrium payo
set in reputation models. Fudenberg and Levine (1992) and Gossner (2011) consider
innitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. A monitoring structure is
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said to be perfect if each player observes the realized action prole in each period. A
monitoring structure is said to be imperfect public if players cannot observe realized
action prole, but they can observe the same noisy signals. They assume there exists
a Stackelberg type as one of the commitment types. A Stackelberg type is a type who
commits to play the action that the long-run player is most likely to commit to. They
show that if there exists a Stackelberg type with a positive probability, then they nd
an upper bound and a lower bound of the equilibrium payo set, which becomes tight
as the discount factor goes to one. Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) present new methods
to derive a set of pairs of equilibrium payo vectors and common priors in a repeated
game when each player can keep track of the other players' beliefs, and they nd a
sucient condition that ensures that each player can keep track of the other players'
beliefs.
We apply the idea of Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) to the case of reputation models
that might not satisfy their sucient condition. We show a method to derive the set
of pairs of the equilibrium payo vectors in which short run players use pure strategies
and common priors in reputation models. We prove that, in reputation models, when
short-run players use pure strategies, each player can keep track of the other players'
beliefs on the equilibrium path, and we apply their technique. In addition, if the
monitoring structure satises a certain standard assumption of reputation models (e.g.,
(a) the actions of short-run players are public, or (b) the probability distribution of
public signals are independent of short-run players' actions), then we show that the
methods of Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) hold in the case that players use mixed
strategies.
The second model is a limited memory model. We assume that short-run players
can observe a sequence of signals whose length is exogenously xed. We consider a
reputation model with a bad type, who commits to play the dominant action of the
stage game. We consider innitely repeated games in some class of games.
We focus on the following feature of reputation. Consider a rm and consumers.
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When consumers believe that the rm produces a good product with similar probabil-
ities, then they choose similar actions. Conjecturing such short-run players' behavior,
the rm also chooses similar actions when consumers believe that the rm produces a
good product with similar probabilities.
To capture the above feature of reputation, we focus on the following strategies as
a class of equilibrium strategies: if a short-run player in a period has a similar belief
to a short-run player in another period, then, similar mixed action proles are chosen
in these two periods.
In the limited memory model, a short-run player can observe the signal in the xed
number of previous periods, but cannot observe the signals in other periods. Hence,
beliefs regarding the long-run player's type and his behavior change depending on the
realized signals in those periods. Thus, the long-run player has a stronger incentive
not to choose the dominant action of the stage game in a limited memory model than
that in an unlimited memory model. Thanks to this strong incentive, we show that
there exists an equilibrium in which the long-run player does not choose the dominant
action of the stage game at any history in a limited memory model, although the
long-run player chooses the dominant action of the stage game at any history in any
equilibrium in an unlimited memory model.
The third model is a costly observation model. We consider a prisoner's dilemma
as the stage game. We assume that a public randomization device is available, but
communication is not available. Each player chooses whether to monitor the opponent
player's action or not after his action choice. If he chooses to monitor, then he pays a
cost and observes the opponent player's action; otherwise, he cannot obtain informa-
tion about the opponent player's action at all. Hence, if a player pays a monitoring
cost in each period, then he can keep track of the sequence of the opponent player's ac-
tions. Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) show the folk theorem with communication
for arbitrary large monitoring costs. Miyagawa et al. (2003) show a sucient condition
of the folk theorem with communication for small monitoring costs. However, these
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two results do not cover an innitely repeated prisoner's dilemma without communi-
cation. In this dissertation, we show an eciency result when the observation costs
are suciently small in repeated prisoner's dilemma. In general, to obtain eciency
result, many papers use complicated strategies (e.g., the six-state automaton strategy
in Miyagawa et al. (2008)). However, the strategy we use in the proof of the eciency
result is less complex than that in previous works.
This dissertation is organized as follows. We provide an overview of the literature
in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we study unlimited memory models. We study limited
memory models in Chapter 4 and costly observation models in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
2.1 Introduction
The following two features of long-run relationships enable agents to maintain good
long-run relationships. One is that each agent can punish the other agent in the
future when the other agent cheats on him. Hence, each player chooses a cooperative
action to avoid the punishment. The other is that each agent can store information
about the other agent. Sometimes, this generates an incentive for a player to choose
a cooperative action in order to generate good information for him. Sometimes, it
facilitates cooperation. Innitely repeated games are suitable to analyze the former
feature. Reputation models are suitable to analyze the latter feature. We review the
literature on repeated games in Section 2.2 and reputation models in Section 2.3.
2.2 Repeated games
The monitoring structure of repeated games is important for punishing the other
player in order to keep cooperation. Consider an innitely played prisoner's dilemma.
If each player observes the realized action prole (perfect monitoring), then players
can maintain a good relationship using a grim trigger strategy. However, if play-
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ers observe a signal that diers from the realized action prole with a positive error
probability (imperfect public monitoring), then players no longer can maintain a good
relationship using a grim trigger strategy. If each player observes dierent signals
from each other (imperfect private monitoring), then players do not have common
knowledge with the player they should punish. In such situations, it is not clear that
players can keep cooperation. Many previous studies examine whether or not players
can maintain good relationships under various monitoring structures.
2.2.1 Monitoring structure
The monitoring structure is perfect if each player observes the realized action prole.
The monitoring structure is imperfect public if players cannot observe realized action
prole, but they can observe the same noisy signals. The monitoring structure is said
to be imperfect private if each player cannot observe the realized action prole, but he
can observe dierent signals each other, which are realized stochastically and are his
private information. The monitoring structure is costly observation if each player can
observe the realized action prole when he pays a cost.
2.2.2 Public monitoring
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) show that, in an innitely repeated game with perfect
monitoring, any individually rational payo vector of a one-shot game of complete
information can arise in an equilibrium if players are suciently patient (the so-called
folk theorem). Some researchers try to extend their result to the case of imperfect
public monitoring. Abreu et al. (1990) present an algorithm to check whether a set of
payos is the equilibrium payo set or not, with a xed discount factor. From their
algorithm, Fudenberg and Levine (1994) develop an algorithm to nd the equilibrium
payo set when the discount factor goes to one. Fudenberg et al. (1994) present folk
theorems in innitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring.
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2.2.3 Private monitoring
Some studies analyze the cases of private monitoring. In this case, players do not have
common knowledge about what the other players observe and it makes coordination
dicult. A seminal work about innitely repeated games with private monitoring
has been conducted by Sekiguchi (1997). He shows that eciency holds without
communication nor public randomization in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under
private monitoring.
Many papers show the folk theorem with each private monitoring structure. Ben-
Porath and Kahneman (1996), Kandori and Matsushima (1998), Compte (1998) and
Obara (2009) present folk theorems in repeated games where communication is avail-
able. Ely and Valimaki (2002), Horner and Olszewski (2006) show folk theorems with-
out communication under almost perfect monitoring. Recently, Sugaya andWolitzky (2014)
present a folk theorem in a model with a mediator who can condition her recommen-
dations on the entire history of actions and recommendations.
2.2.4 Costly observation
The above results assume that observation is costless. However, some papers assume
that observation is costly. Lehrer (1989, 1992a, 1992b) considers two-player repeated
games with no discounting. He shows that costly observation is supported in the
equilibrium. Furthermore, he shows that an action prole can be played in the equi-
librium even when there exists another short-run best reply that does not aect the
other player's signal, if the player can obtain more precise information from the action
than the short-run best reply. That is, he shows that costly observation is supported
in the equilibrium.
Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) consider innitely repeated games in which he
observes the other players' actions if a player pays a cost, and, he does not observe at
all otherwise. They assume that communication is available and show folk theorem
even if the monitoring cost is high. Miyagawa et al. (2003) consider similar models
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to those in Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003). Miyagawa et al. (2003) assume that
communication is not available and each player can choose at least three kinds of
actions. Miyagawa et al. (2003) show a sucient condition for the folk theorem when
the monitoring cost is small.
We consider an innitely repeated prisoner's dilemma without communication. The
results in Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) and Miyagawa et al. (2003) do not cover
this game because communication is not available and each player can choose only
two kinds of actions. We show that eciency holds if a public randomization device
is available.
The above two studies assume that if a player does not pay any monitoring cost,
then he cannot observe at all. Miyagawa et al. (2008) consider a deviation from this
assumption. They assume that each player can observe a private signal even if he
does not incur a cost. Miyagawa et al. (2008) show a folk theorem in repeated games
without communication for any level of monitoring costs. Miyagawa et al. (2008)
use complicated strategies (e.g., six-state automata strategy in prisoner's dilemma)
to prove their results. We focus on a three-state automaton strategy and show that
eciency holds when public randomization is available and the monitoring cost is
suciently small.
Some studies assume that if a player incurs a cost, then he can obtain additional
information but not about the action chosen by the other player in the current period.
Kandori and Obara (2004) assume that the monitoring activity reveals not only the
rival's action but also the \monitoring activity" and demonstrates eciency in a certain
class of strategies. Flesch and Perea (2009) assume that each player can additionally
observe \the action chosen in the past" if he incurs additional cost. They show that
if players can choose at least four actions, then the folk theorem holds even when
neither public randomization nor communication is available. Awaya (2014) conducts
a robustness check of the study of Takahashi (2010). Takahashi (2010) presents a folk
theorem in repeated games where a continuum of players are randomly matched in
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each period to play the prisoner's dilemma with a dierent partner. Awaya (2014)
introduces monitoring costs to the model of Takahashi (2010) and consider a model in
which each player can observe \the sequence of actions that the opponent player chose
in the past" if he observes the other player. He shows a folk theorem by constructing an
equilibrium strategy when the monitoring cost is innitesimal. That is, the monitoring
cost is zero, but each player prefers not monitoring when monitoring decision does not
aect his expected payo (lexicographic preference). In contrast to the innitesimal
cost, he also shows that if the monitoring cost is strictly positive, then the strategy is
not an equilibrium. In addition, if the monitoring cost is greater than the maximum
dierence of stage-game payos, then any equilibrium is a repetition of stage-game
Nash equilibrium action prole. In Chapter 5 of the current dissertation, we assume
that if a player incurs a cost, then he observes the action chosen by the other player,
but he cannot obtain any information if he does not incur a cost. We show that
eciency holds when monitoring cost is suciently small and public randomization is
available.
2.3 Reputation models
Another feature of long-run relationship is that each agent can store the information
about the other agent. Hence, a long-run player has an incentive to choose an action
in order to produce a good information for him. This feature dramatically changes
long-run relationship. Especially, it changes long-run relationships when there exists
incomplete information.
Let us consider reputation models. A reputation model is the following innitely
repeated game. There exist a long run player who has a type, and a sequence of short
run players. In each period, a long-run player and a single short-run player play a
stage-game. After players play a stage-game, the short-run player exits the innitely
repeated game, and a new short-run player participates in the innitely repeated game
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and he plays a stage-game in the next period.
In reputation models, the realized signals could contain information about the
type. Hence, if the long-run player is suciently patient, then he has an incentive to
exert eort in order to give short-run players information that is favorable for him.
This incentive derives from incomplete information about the characteristics. Thus,
in reputation models, equilibrium behaviors dier substantially from those in repeated
games with no incomplete information. In some models, this change excludes some
equilibrium payos from the equilibrium payo set.
We analyze reputation models with a bad type, who commits to playing the dom-
inant action of the stage game. Hence, in particular, we review the literature about
reputation models with bad types.
2.3.1 Standard reputation models
Selten (1978) considers the following chain store game. The chain store game has
an incumbent (player 1) and an entrant (player 2). At the beginning of the chain
store game, player 2 must decide either to enter the market (IN) or to stay out of
the market (OUT). No further decisions are made if player 2's decision was OUT. If
player 2’s decision was IN, player 1 has to choose between cooperative behavior (CO)
and aggressive behavior (AG). The payo is summarized as follows.
sPlayer 2
OUT





s (2; 1)
Q
Q
Q
Q
QQsIN
Player 1
HHHHHH



AG
CO
s
s(1; 2)
(0; 0)
Chain store games
Selten (1978) shows that player 1 cannot deter player 2's IN in the unique subgame
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perfect equilibrium of the nitely repeated chain store game. However, this result does
not seem to be intuitive.
Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) reexamine the chain
store game in Selten (1978). They add to it incomplete information about player 1's
type and illustrate the role of reputation. They consider a \tough" type, who chooses
AG in each period, as one of player 1's possible types. If player 2 believes that player 1
is a tough type with high probability, then player 2 prefers OUT to IN in order to
avoid (IN,AG). Hence, player 1 of \normal" type, who can choose his action between
AG and CO in each period, has an incentive to choose AG to pretend to be the tough
type in order to deter IN. They show that player 1 can succeed in deterring IN by
playing AG in early periods and therefore obtains a higher equilibrium payo than
that in the chain store game in Selten (1978).
Repeated normal form games are often analyzed to study reputation models. In
particular, the following product choice game is often analyzed.
Product choice game
Player 2
h `
Player 1
H 2; 3 0; 2
L 3; 1 1; 1
Action L is a strictly dominant action for player 1. Player 2's best reply is action
h (resp. `) if player 1 chooses action H (resp. L). In the following, we call an action a
Stackelberg action if the long-run player is most likely to commit himself to play the
action. We call a commitment type a Stackelberg type if the type commits to play a
Stackelberg action in each period.
Fudenberg and Levine (1989) consider innitely repeated normal form games. They
generalize the results of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982)
to innitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and show that if there exists a
Stackelberg type with positive probability, then the inmum of the equilibrium set
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of a long-run player increases as the discount factor goes to one. Fudenberg and
Levine (1992) and Gossner (2011) extend the results of Fudenberg and Levine (1989)
to innitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. In the literature on
reputation models, such a change in the equilibrium payo is referred to as a reputation
eect.
2.3.2 Reputation of bad types
Bad type is a commitment type, who commits to play the dominant action of the
stage game in each period. We can interpret a bad type as an inept type as follows.
Consider a product choice game. A bad type is a player who has no ability to choose
action H. In reality, there is a dierence in the technologies of the rms. Some rms
might have no ability to produce high-quality products. In that case, we interpret the
rm as a bad type. To analyze such a situation, the study of the reputation model
with a bad type is important for understanding the long-run relationship.
Recently, some studies introduced a bad type instead of a Stackelberg type. Bad
types also have a dramatic eect on the equilibrium behavior, even if they oer very
close to complete information.
Ely and Valimaki (2003) show that if there exists a bad type, then a supremum
of the equilibrium payo set in some reputation models converges to a stage-game
Nash equilibrium payo as the discount factor goes to one. That is, players fail to
maintain good relationships. Ely et al. (2008) generalize Ely and Valimaki (2003) and
consider games such that short-run players have an option of whether to deal with the
long-run player who can choose a deceiving action to look good in the current period.
Ely et al. (2008) call the generalized games bad reputation games. Ely et al. (2008)
show that the supremum of the equilibrium payo set converges to a stage-game Nash
equilibrium payo as the discount factor goes to one.
Our model in Chapter 3 is not a bad reputation game because the stage game in
the dissertation has no deceiving action. We show that a unique sequential equilibrium
14
in a class of equilibria in an unlimited memory model is a type of stage-game Nash
equilibrium. Hence, our results are similar to those of Ely and Valimaki (2003) and
Ely et al. (2008).
In contrast to Ely and Valimaki (2003) and Ely et al. (2008), Mailath and Samuel-
son (2001) show that a bad type helps to maintain a good reputation in some models.
They consider a product choice game and high-eort strategy. A high-eort strategy
is a strategy prole where player 1 chooses action H for any history, and short-run
players choose best responses to it. If there exists no bad type, player 1 does not have
an incentive to play action H because whatever signal is realized, the continuation
strategy of player 2 is a repetition of action h. If there exists a bad type, player 1 has
an incentive to play action H because player 2 changes her action to action ` when
player 2 strongly believes that player 1 is a bad type.
However, even if there exists a bad type, a high-eort strategy is not a Nash
equilibrium in an unlimited memory model. This is because player 1 loses the incentive
to play action H at a point in time such that player 2 strongly believes that player 1
is a bad type. Mailath and Samuelson (2001) introduce stochastic change of player 1's
type, that is, player 1's type changes in each period with positive probability.
Because of this stochastic change of player 1's type, old public signals become less
informative about the present long-run player's type as time goes by. Hence, whatever
signals are realized in the past, short-run players do not strongly believe that player 1
is a bad type. Thus, Mailath and Samuelson (2001) show that a high-eort strategy
is a Nash equilibrium in reputation models with a bad type and stochastic change of
player 1's type. That is, they show that a bad type and stochastic change of player 1's
type lead to a cooperative relationship.
Our results in limited memory models in Chapter 4 are similar to those in Mailath
and Samuelson (2001). We also nd that a high-eort strategy is a Nash equilibrium in
limited memory models. That is, we show that bad type and limited memory lead to
a cooperative relationship. Thus, we nd that limited memory and stochastic change
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of player 1's type have similar eects on reputation.
2.3.3 Limited memory
Recently, some works have tried to study reputation models under limited memory.
Limited memory is a new model where short-run players keep track of the information
from a xed number of previous periods, but cannot keep track of the information in
the other periods. Limited memory models are one of the important models for un-
derstanding long-run relationships. Consider a restaurant and consumers. Consumers
buy a magazine about restaurants in their city to decide which restaurant they will
choose. However, the magazine contains only recent information about the restaurant.
Old information about the restaurant appears in an old magazine and it is no longer
available. Hence, sometimes short-run players have limited memory. Analyses of rep-
utation models with limited memory are important for understanding these long-run
relationships.
Ekmekci (2011) considers a reputation model with a bad type. In his model, there
exists a central mechanism that constructs a report from the sequence of signals in
the past and sends it to short-run players. Short-run players receive the report, but
cannot observe either signals or reports made in the past. Thus, short-run players
have a one-period memory. He shows that there exists a central mechanism under
which players can maintain a cooperative relationship in the long run. Our results
in Chapter 4 also show that there exists a sequential equilibrium where players can
maintain a cooperative relationship in the long run. However, our results do not need
a central mechanism.
In the present dissertation, we dene a limited memory model as a reputation model
in which short-run players can observe signals in a xed number of previous periods.
Liu and Skrzypacz (2014) consider limited memory models with perfect monitoring.
They show a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which players play Pareto-ecient
action proles. Liu (2011) considers a reputation model with costly observation. He
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shows a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which short-run players use random
monitoring and players can maintain a good relationship in the long run. We nd a
pure strategy sequential equilibrium in which player 1 chooses actionH for any history,
although Liu and Skrzypacz (2014) and Liu (2011) nd a mixed strategy equilibrium
in which player 1 chooses action L with probability 1 at some history.
Liu and Skrzypacz (2014) and Liu (2011) assume that no calendar time is available
to make their analyses simple. However, we and Monte (2013) assume that calendar
time exists. Monte (2013) considers reputation models with various commitment types
and shows that player 2 does not believe that player 1 is a specic type with high
probability for any history. This property of limited memory helps to maintain good
relationships. We show that there exists a sequential equilibrium in which a Pareto-
ecient action prole is played for any history.
We show two new results in the study of reputation with limited memory. We
focus on the following strategies as equilibrium strategies : if a short-run player in
a period has a similar belief to a belief of a short-run player in another period, then
similar mixed action proles are chosen in those two periods. Ely et al. (2008) show
that it converges to a stage-game Nash equilibrium payo in a bad reputation game.
However, we show that the supremum of the equilibrium payo set does not converge
to a stage-game Nash equilibrium payo even when the discount factor goes to one in a
limited memory model with a bad type. This result does not need either replacement
of the long-run player's type as in Mailath and Samuelson (2001) or an exogenous
central mechanism as in Ekmekci (2011). The other result is that any equilibria is a
repetition of the stage-game Nash equilibrium action prole. Hence, we nd that a
limited memory helps players build and maintain a cooperative relationship.
2.4 Summary
We show the following results.
17
In Chapter 3, we analyze unlimited memory models. We apply the idea of Cole and
Kocherlakota (2001) to reputation models in which short-run players use pure strate-
gies. That is, we nd an algorithm that solves for the set of pairs of the equilibrium
payo vectors in which short-run players use pure strategies and common priors in
reputation models. In addition, if the standard assumption of reputation models (e.g.,
observability of short-run players' actions) holds, then we can apply the result of Cole
and Kocherlakota (2001) to reputation models in which players use mixed strategies.
These ndings are new results about the equilibrium payo set in reputation models.
In Chapter 4, we analyze a limited memory model. We consider innitely repeated
games with a bad type. Our study is the rst attempt to study a combination of
a limited memory model and a bad type. We focus on the following strategies as
equilibrium strategies : if a short-run player in a period has a similar belief to a belief
of a short-run player in another period, then similar mixed action proles are chosen in
those two periods. We show that a unique equilibrium in an unlimited memory model
is a repetition of a stage-game Nash equilibrium. However, there exists an equilibrium
in which the long-run player does not choose a dominant action of the stage game to
build and maintain his reputation in a limited memory model. Based on these results,
we nd that limited memory leads to cooperative relationships.
In Chapter 5, we analyze costly observation models. We consider an innitely
repeated prisoner's dilemma without communication. The results in previous works
about costly observation do not cover this game because communication is not available
and players can choose only two kinds of actions. We show that if public randomization
is available, then eciency holds when the monitoring costs are suciently small.
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Chapter 3
Equilibrium payo set in
reputation model
3.1 Introduction
In some models, incomplete information changes a long-run relationship dramatically.
For example, consider an entry deterrence in a nitely repeated game. Selten (1978)
shows that, in a nitely repeated chain store game, each entrant enters the market in
the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. That is, he shows that we cannot ex-
plain entry deterrence by nitely repeated games with complete information. However,
if there exists incomplete information, entry deterrence can be explained by nitely
repeated games. In fact, Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982)
show that if there exists incomplete information about an incumbent's type in a nitely
repeated chain store game, then entrants do not enter the market in the early periods
on the sequential equilibrium path.
Repeated games under incomplete information is important, but it is more complex
than games under complete information. Many papers show an upper bound and a
lower bound of the equilibrium payo set instead of characterizing the equilibrium
payo set. In this chapter, we consider reputation models, in which there exist a
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long-run player who has a type and a sequence of short -run players and analyze the
following set of pairs of payo vectors and common priors. We focus on the set of pairs
(v; ), where v is a vector of Nash equilibrium payos in which short-run players use
pure strategies and  is a common prior over the set of types. We show the following
two results: (i) the set is the largest xed point of a set-valued operator of the set of
pairs of payo vectors and probability distributions over the set of types, and (ii) the
set is the limit of iterating this operator on any superset of it.
A large literature examines innitely repeated games under incomplete informa-
tion. The literature can be grouped roughly as follows. One group involves repeated
games with long-run players. In most of the studies in this group, players are uncertain
initially about the distribution of signals and their stage-game payos. Many stud-
ies (e.g., Wiseman (2005), Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011) and Yamamoto (2013))
develop folk theorems under the condition that each player can statistically distinguish
between any two states by realized signals (statewise full rank condition).
The other group analyzes repeated games in which there are two kinds of players:
a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players who are uncertain about the
types of the long-run player, which is the model we adopt in this chapter. Many
studies (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992) and Gossner (2011)) analyze the
equilibrium payo sets when the discount factor goes to one, and show that in some
innitely repeated games, the equilibrium payo sets under incomplete information
dier markedly from that under complete information.
Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) apply the results of Abreu et al. (1990) to the case
of the innitely repeated incomplete information games with multiple long-run players
under some conditions. Abreu et al. (1990) present methods to derive the equilibrium
payo set in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. A monitoring structure
is said to be imperfect public if each player cannot observe realized action prole, but
can observe the same signal, which is realized stochastically. It means that they cannot
punish any player depending on actions. They show that if the full support assumption
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is satised in a innitely repeated game with complete information, it holds that (i)
the Nash equilibrium payo set is the largest xed point of a set-valued operator of
the set of payos, and (ii) the Nash equilibrium payo set is the limit of iterating this
operator on any superset of the Nash equilibrium payo set.
Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) analyze games in which the state of each player
changes stochastically in each period. Their idea is as follows. If each player can keep
track of the posterior beliefs of the other players, then any subgame can be analyzed
as the game from the initial period given the posterior beliefs. They apply the idea of
Abreu et al. (1990) and they present a method to derive a set of pairs of the equilibrium
payo vectors and common priors.
To ensure that each player can keep track of the posterior belief of the other players,
they focus on Markov-private strategies and games in which beliefs are Markov. A
strategy prole is Markov-private if each player's strategy depends on his past private
information only through his current private state. A strategy prole is said to be
Markov-private equilibrium if it is a sequential equilibrium and Markov-private. Given
a game, beliefs are said to be Markov if, for any Markov-private strategy prole, each
player's belief about the other players' states depend on his private information only
through his current state, both on and o the equilibrium path.
They show the following two results about Markov-private equilibria. First, they
dene the set of pairs (~v; ~), where ~v is a vector of Markov-private equilibrium payos
and ~ is the initial common prior over the set of states. They show that this set is
the largest xed point of a set-valued operator of the set of pairs of payo vectors and
probability distributions over the set of states. Second, they show that the largest
xed point is the limit of iterating this operator on a suciently large initial set of
(v; ) pairs.
Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) focus on games in which beliefs are Markov. How-
ever, beliefs are not Markov in many games. For example, consider the following team
production game in which the probability of success depends on both players' eort
21
choices. Each player can observe the output of the team production, but he cannot
observe the eort choice of the other player. Nature selects players' types at the be-
ginning of the repeated game. The state space is the type space of each player. Fix
a carrot and stick strategy in which players choose high eort if and only if produc-
tion occurs successfully in the previous period. Each player conjectures the types of
the other member. This conjecture depends on not only his type (state) but also the
action chosen by himself (his private information which is irrelevant to his type o
the equilibrium path). Based on the same reasons as discussed above, belief are not
Markov in many games.
The contribution of this chapter is to apply the idea of Cole and Kocherlakota (2001)
to the case of the pure strategy equilibrium payo sets in reputation models in which
beliefs might not be Markov. We focus on reputation models which is more restric-
tive than their models in which they allow that states change throughout a play. We
dene the set of pairs of pure strategy equilibrium payo v and common prior over
the long-run player's type  in the same way as Cole and Kocherlakota (2001). We
show that (i) the set is the largest xed point of a set-valued operator of the set of
pairs of payos and probability distributions over the set of states, and (ii) the set is
the limit of iterating this operator on any superset of it. In addition, we show that,
these two results hold even when players can use mixed strategies under a class of
standard reputation model assumptions; that is, (a) the distribution of public signals
is independent of the short players' actions, or (b) the short-run players' actions are
observable.
The key idea of this chapter is that if short-run players use pure strategies, then each
player can keep track of the posterior beliefs of the other players on the equilibrium
path in the same way as Cole and Kocherlakota (2001). Fix a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. Then, the long-run player can know what a short-run player plays in
period 0 because short-run players use \pure" strategy. Hence, the long-run player
knows short run player's private history in period 1 on the equilibrium path. Thus, the
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long-run player can know what a short-run player play in period 1 because short-run
players use pure strategy. We can use the same argument in period t = 0; 1; 2; : : :
Thus, a long run player precisely infers short run players' private history given any
public history on the equilibrium path. Therefore, a long run player can keep track of
short run players' belief on the equilibrium path. It implies that the idea of Cole and
Kocherlakota (2001) can be applied to the case of reputation models in which beliefs
might not be Markov.
In Section 3.6, we discuss sucient conditions to apply the result of Cole and
Kocherlakota (2001) to reputation models in which short-run players use mixed strate-
gies.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Sec-
tion 3.2. Section 3.3 studies the relationship between the Nash equilibrium and public
equilibrium (PE) and Section 3.4 studies the public equilibria. Section 3.5 presents
an example. Section 3.6 discusses the case in which players use mixed strategies.
Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Model
We consider innitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, and focus on
the set of Nash equilibrium payos in which the short-run players' strategies are pure.
First, we explain an innitely repeated game with complete information. Next, we
introduce incomplete information to the innitely repeated game.
3.2.1 The complete information game
The stage-game consists of player 1 and player 2. Let Ai be the nite set of player i's
actions. Each player i chooses action ai 2 Ai. Let ui(a) be an expected stage-game
payo for player i given action prole a 2 A  A1  A2. Each player cannot observe
the opponent player's action. Given action prole a 2 A, a signal y is realized with
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probability (yja) and each player observes the signal. We call y a public signal and
we let Y denote the nite set of public signals.
We consider imperfect public monitoring. A monitoring structure is said to be
imperfect public if players cannot observe realized action prole, but they can observe
the same noisy signals. The following assumption ensures that, for any action prole,
each player cannot observe the other player's action directly.
Assumption 3.1 (full support) For any a 2 A, it holds that (yja) > 0 for any y 2 Y .
By Assumption 3.1, for any Nash equilibrium, any public history is on the equilib-
rium path. Thus, each player cannot observe other player's deviation.
For any set Z, let us dene (Z) as the set of probability distributions over Z.
Abusing notation, for any mixed action 1 2 (A1) and pure action a2 2 A2, we
dene (yj1; a2) and ui(1; a2), as follows.
(yj1; a2) 
X
a12A1
(yja1; a2)1(a1); and
ui(1; a2) 
X
a12A1
ui(a1; a2)1(a1):
We consider innitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. Player 1
is a long-run player with discount factor  2 [0; 1) and player 2 is a sequence of short-
run players. At the beginning of each period t = 0; 1; : : : , a signal xt that is uniformly
distributed over [0; 1] is realized and each player observes the signal.
The timing in period t is summarized as follows. First, a sunspot xt is realized.
Second, each player i simultaneously chooses an action ati 2 Ai. Third, a public
signal yt is realized.
We denote by hti = (x
s; asi ; y
s)t 1s=0, the private history of player i. We call a sequence
of public signals in the past (xs; ys)t 1s=0 the public history and denote it by h
t. In what
follows, let N be the set of natural numbers. For any t 2 N, Hti  ([0; 1]  Ai  Y )t
is the set of private histories of player i in period t, and Ht  ([0; 1]  Y )t is the
set of public histories in period t. Let H01;H02 and H0 be any singleton set. That is,
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H01 = H02 = H0 = fg. Let us dene Hi as the set of private histories of player i and
H as the set of public histories. That is, Hi = [1t=0Hti and H = [1t=0Ht. Player i's
strategy is a function of Hi  [0; 1] to (Ai). For expositional simplicity, if player i's
strategy i is pure, we regard i as a function of Hti  [0; 1] to Ai instead of (Ai).
3.2.2 The incomplete information game
Nature selects player 1's type from a nite set 
 according to common prior  2 (
).
Player 1's type is his private information and does not change throughout a play. Let
u1;! be the expected stage-game payo function for player 1 of type !. Let us denote
by 1;! the strategy of player 1 of type ! and denote 1 = (1;!)!2
. Player 1 of type
! maximizes his discounted average expected stage-game payos given 2.
U1;!(1;!; 2) = (1  )
1X
t=0
tE[u1;!(a
t)j1;!; 2]
Let 2(!jht2) be player 2's belief about the type of player 1 given the private his-
tory ht2, the common prior , and a strategy prole   (1; 2) where we suppress
;  in 2. Player 2 in period t maximizes the expected stage-game payo in period t
given 1; h
t
2 and 2. We use Nash equilibrium as a solution concept. Hence, we do not
have to dene beliefs over private histories.
Our model allows randomized commitment type, who play a mixed action prole in
each period. Consider a type who are indierent to any action prole and he chooses
the same mixed action in each period. Then, we interpret this type as a randomized
commitment type.
3.3 Nash equilibrium and public equilibrium
In this section, we show the key ideas of this chapter. First, we dene public equilib-
rium (PE). Second, we show that, for any Nash equilibrium in which 2 is pure, there
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exists a PE in which each player obtains the same equilibrium payo as that of the
Nash equilibrium.
Denition 3.1 Player i's strategy i is public if, for any t  1; hti = (xs; asi ; ys)t 1s=0,
h^
t
i = (x^
s; a^si ; y^
s)t 1s=0 and x 2 [0; 1], it holds that if xs = x^s and ys = y^s for any s  t 1,
then i(h
t
i; x) = i(h^
t
i; x).
Given common prior  2 (
), a strategy prole  is public equilibrium (PE) if 1
and 2 are public and  is a Nash equilibrium.
In what follows, for expositional simplicity, we denote the public strategy of player 1
of type !, 1;!, by a function of H [0; 1]! (A1) and the strategy of player 2 which
is pure and public by a function of H  [0; 1] ! A2. We show that for any Nash
equilibrium  in which 2 is pure, there exists a PE in which each player obtains the
same payo as that of the Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that Assumption 3.1 is satised. For any  2 (
), x
a Nash equilibrium  = (1; 2) in which 2 is pure. There exists a PE 
p in which
U1;!(
p
1;!; 
p
2) = U1;!(1;!; 2) holds for any ! 2 
 and p2 is pure and the beliefs of
the short-run players are common knowledge on the equilibrium path.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We show a sketch of the proof. Fix a Nash equilibrium  = (1; 2) in which
2 is pure. Given any public history h
t on the equilibrium path, player 1 can infer
precisely the player 2's private history ht2 on the equilibrium path because player 2
uses pure strategy. Full support assumption ensures that any public history ht is on
the equilibrium path. For any public history ht = (xs; ys)t 1s=0, let z2(h
t) be a private
history ht2 = (~x
s; ~ys; ~as2)
t 1
s=0 such that h
t
2 is on the equilibrium path, and (~x
s; ~ys) =
(xs; ys) for s = 0; 1; : : : ; t   1. We dene public strategy of player 2 as p2 such that
p2(h
t)  2(z2(ht)) for any ht and for any t. The strategies p2 and 2 might prescribe
dierent actions o the equilibrium path of . However, they prescribe the same
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action on the equilibrium path of . Full support assumption ensures that any private
history of player 2 o the equilibrium path is not realized even when player 1 changes
his strategies. Hence, for any 01 and ! 2 
, U1;!(01;!; p2) = U1;!(01;!; 2) holds.
Thus, 1 is a best response to 
p
2 because (1; 2) is a Nash equilibrium. In addition,
player 2 is short-run player and we focus on Nash equilibria. Thus, player 2 does not
care about a strategy o the equilibrium path. Hence, strategy p2 is best response to
strategy 1 because (1; 2) is a Nash equilibrium. That is, strategy prole (1; 
p
2) is
also a Nash equilibrium.
Given Nash equilibrium (1; 
p
2), we dene the following public strategy.
p1;!(h
t; xt) 
Z
~h
t
12Ht1
1;!(~h
t
1; x
t)dg(~h
t
1j1;!; p2; ht; xt); 8! 2 
;
where g is a conditional probability measure onHti given (1; p2), ht and xt. This means
that U1;!(
p
1;!; 
p
2) = U1;!(1;!; 
p
2) for any !. It implies that 
p
1 is a best reply to 
p
2.
The public strategy p1(h
t) is a conditional expectation of 1(h
t
1) given (1; 2), h
t and
xt. Hence, p2 is a best response to 
p
1 because conditional expectation of Eht1 [1(h
t
1)jht]
and p1(h
t) are the same for any ht. Hence, (p1; 
p
2) is a Nash equilibrium.
Based on the above discussions, it also holds that U1;!(
p
1;!; 
p
2)(= U1;!(1;!; 
p
2)) =
U1;!(1;!; 2) for any !.
Player 1 can keep track of the posterior belief of player 2 on the equilibrium path
because player 1 can infer precisely the player 2's private history on the equilibrium
path.
3.4 Public equilibrium
It has been shown that, for any Nash equilibrium  in which 2 is pure, the Nash
equilibrium payo can be achieved by a public strategy in which the beliefs of short-
run players on the equilibrium path are common knowledge. Based on the results of
the previous section, we focus on a public strategy without loss of generality in the
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sense of Proposition 3.1. In this section, we analyze public equilibria instead of Nash
equilibria.
Let us denote by a function b1 : 
  [0; 1] ! (A1) player 1's behavior strategy,
and we let b2 : [0; 1] ! A2 denote player 2's behavior strategy. For any  2 (
),
function b1 and b2, we dene a function T : (
)(A1)f
[0;1]gA[0;1]2  [0; 1]Y !
(
) as follows.
T (; b1; b2; x; y)(!) =
(yjb1(!; x); b2(x))(!)P
!02
 (yjb1(!0; x); b2(x))(!0)
; 8x 2 [0; 1]; 8y 2 Y ; 8! 2 
:
That is, T is a function that prescribes the Bayesian updating of  when public signals
x and y are realized given the behavior strategy prole (b1; b2). We dene R as the set
of real numbers.
We dene the set of pairs of the equilibrium payos and common priors in which
the strategy of player 2 is pure.
V =
8>>><>>>:(v; ) 2 R

 (
)

Given common prior  2 (
); there exists a PE p
in which U1;!(
p
1;!; 
p
2) = v(!) for any ! 2 
,
and p2 is pure.
9>>>=>>>;
For some games, the set V might be empty. One of sucient conditions that the set
V is nonempty is that the set of types of player 1 is singleton and the stage-game has
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Let us denote byW  R
(
) a subset of the set of pairs of equilibrium payos
and common priors.
Denition 3.2 Fix a subset W  R
  (
). A pair of a function R : 
 ! R
and a probability distribution  2 (
) is decomposable over W if there exist a
behavior strategy b1 : 
  [0; 1] ! (A1), a behavior strategy b2 : [0; 1] ! (A2)
28
and  : 
 [0; 1] Y ! R, such that
R(!) = EX
"
(1  )u1;!(b1(!;X); b2(X)) + 
X
y2Y
(yjb1(!;X); b2(X))(!;X; y)
#
; 8! 2 
;
(3.1)
(1  )u1;!(b1(!; x); b2(x)) + 
X
y2Y
(yjb1(!; x); b2(x))(!; x; y)
 (1  )u1;!(a1; b2(x)) + 
X
y2Y
(yja1; b2(x))(!; x; y); 8a1 2 A1; 8x 2 [0; 1]; 8! 2 
;
(3.2)
b2(x) 2 argmax
a022A2
X
!2

u2(b1(!; x); a
0
2)(!); 8x 2 [0; 1]; (3.3)
((; x; y); T (; b1; b2; x; y)) 2 W; 8x 2 [0; 1]; 8y 2 Y : (3.4)
The rst condition describes player i's payo depending on his type when the
continuation payo from next period is given by (!; x; y). The second and third
conditions require that player i (weakly) prefers bi.
The following operator is analogous to theB operator in Cole and Kocherlakota (2001).
Denition 3.3 Let us denote the set of (R; ) which is decomposable over W by
B(W ). A set W is self-generating if W  B(W ) holds.
The following theorem helps us examine whether a set W is a subset of the set V
or not.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that Assumption 3.1 is satised. If a set W is bounded and
self-generating, then W  V holds.
Proof. By the denition of B(W ), any (R; ) 2 B(W ) is decomposable overW . Hence,
for any (R; ) 2 B(W ), there exist functions b1, b2 and  that satisfy Denition 3.2.
We consider functions ~b1 : B(W ) ! (A1)
[0;1], ~b2 : B(W ) ! (A2)[0;1] and ~ :
B(W ) ! R
[0;1]Y such that, for any (R; ) 2 B(W ), the functions prescribe b1, b2
and  respectively that satisfy Denition 3.2 .
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Fix any (R; ) 2 B(W ). For any public history h 2 H, we dene a pair of a
function ~R
h
: 
! R and a probability distribution ~h 2 (
) to construct equilibrium
strategy. First, we dene ~R
h0  R, ~h0  . By the denition of (R; ) 2 B(W ), we
have (~R
h0
; ~h
0
) 2 B(W ).
Next, we x t  0 and consider period t + 1. Fix a public history in period t, ht.
Suppose that (~R
ht
; ~h
t
) 2 B(W ). For any xt and yt, we dene ~Rh
t(xt;yt)
and ~h
t(xt;yt)
when public history ht  (xt; yt) is realized in period t+ 1 as follows.
~R
ht(xt;yt) ~( ~Rh
t
; ~h
t
)(; xt; yt);
~h
t(xt;yt) T (~ht ;~b1( ~Rh
t
; ~h
t
);~b2( ~R
ht
; ~h
t
); xt; yt)):
We have (~R
ht(xt;yt)
; ~h
t(xt;yt)) 2 B(W ) . Finally, we dene public strategy: p1;!(ht; x) 
~b1( ~R
ht
; ~h
t
)(!; x) and p2(h
t; x)  ~b2( ~Rh
t
; ~h
t
)(x).
By the denition of ~R, for any ht 2 H and for any ! 2 
, it holds that
EX

(1  )u1;!(p1;!(ht; X); p2(ht; X))

=~R
ht
(!)  EX
"X
y2Y
(yjp1;!(ht; X); p2(ht; X)) ~R
ht(X;y)
(!)
#
:
Let us dene t as a probability measure on Ht given p. The set W is bounded.
Hence, for any ! 2 
, P1t=0 t Rht2Ht ~Rht(!)dt(htjp1;!; p2) is bounded.
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Thus, we obtain U1;!(
p
1;!; 
p
2) as follows.
U1;!(
p
1;!; 
p
2)
=
1X
t=0
t
Z
ht2Ht
EX

(1  )u1;!(p1;!(ht; X); p2(ht; X))

dt(htjp1;!; p2)
=
1X
t=0
t
Z
ht2Ht
(
~R
ht
(!)  EX
"X
y2Y
(yjp1;!(ht; X); p2(ht; X)) ~R
htXy
(!)
#)
dt(htjp1;!; p2)
=
1X
t=0
Z
ht2Ht
t ~R
ht
(!)dt(htjp1;!; p2) 
Z
ht+12Ht+1
t+1 ~R
ht+1
(!)dt(ht+1jp1;!; p2)

=
1X
t=0
Z
ht2Ht
t ~R
ht
(!)dt(htjp1;!; p2) 
1X
t=0
Z
ht+12Ht+1
t+1 ~R
ht+1
(!)dt(ht+1jp1;!; p2)
=
Z
h02H0
~R
h0
(!)d0(h0jp1;!; p2)
+
1X
t=1
Z
ht2Ht
t ~R
ht
(!)dt(htjp1;!; p2) 
1X
t=0
Z
ht+12Ht+1
t+1 ~R
ht+1
(!)dt(ht+1jp1;!; p2)
=~R
h0
(!) = R(!):
It is proved that, for any ! 2 
, U1;!(p1;!; p2) = R(!).
In the same way, we nd that the continuation payo of player 1 of type ! for public
history ht is equal to ~R
ht
(!). Thus, for any ! and ht 2 H, any one shot deviation at
ht from p1(!; h
t) is not protable for player 1 of type ! by the denition of ~R. Thus,
p1 is the best response to 
p
2.
Finally, we consider the best response of player 2. By the construction of p,
for any ht 2 H, the beliefs 2(!jht; p) is equal to ~(ht). Hence, p2(ht) is the best
response to p1 given 2(!jht; p) by denition of ~b2. It has been proved that p is a
Nash equilibrium.
The next theorem shows that the set V is one of the xed points of operator B.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that Assumption 3.1 is satised. The set V is bounded and
self-generating.
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Proof. The set V is bounded because 
 and A are nite sets. We show that V  B(V ).
Fix any (v; ) 2 V and a PE strategy prole p such that U1;!(1;!; 2) = v(!) for
any ! 2 
 and p2 is pure. Let U1;!(p1;!; p2jx; y) be the expected continuation payo
of player 1 of type ! at h1 = (x; y). We consider the following b1; b2 and .
b1(!; x) =
p
1;!(h
0; x);
b2(x) =
p
2(h
0; x);
(!; x; y) =U1;!(
p
1;!; 
p
2jx; y):
Condition (3.1)-(3.3) in Denition 3.2 are satised because  is a Nash equilibrium.
For any (x; y) 2 H1, a pair of continuation payos (; x; y) and T (; b1; b2; x; y) are
in V because p is a PE. That is, Condition (3.4) is satised. Therefore, we obtain
V  B(V ).
The following proposition shows a monotonicity of B in the sense of set inclusion.
It is shown that the set V is the greatest xed point of operator B.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that Assumption 3.1 is satised. For any W 1 and W 2, if
W 1  W 2, then B(W 1)  B(W 2). The set V is the largest set among the bounded
and self-generating sets.
Proof. Fix w 2 B(W 1). By denition, w is decomposable over W 1( W 2). Hence,
w 2 B(W 2). Let (W )2 be a family of the set that is bounded and self-generating.
For any  2 , W   V by Theorem 3.1. By Proposition 3.2, the set V is bounded
and self-generating.
The following theorem shows a technique to derive a tight bound of the set V . In
addition, the theorem ensures that we can obtain the set V by iterating the technique.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that Assumption 3.1 is satised. Let a set W be a bounded
superset of the set V . Let us dene W 0  W , and for n = 1; 2 : : : ; W n  B(W n 1) \
W n 1. Then fW ng is a decreasing sequence and limn!1W n = V .
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Proof. Fix any setW such thatW  V . By denition, fW ng is a decreasing sequence.
Thus, limn!1W n is \n2NW n. For any n, W n+1  B(W n). Hence, we obtain
lim
n!1
W n = lim
n!1
W n+1  lim
n!1
B(W n) = B

lim
n!1
W n

Thus, limn!1W n is self-generating. In addition, it holds that
W = W 0  W 1  W 2   
Thus, limn!1W n is bounded. Hence, we obtain limn!1W n  V by Theorem 3.1.
Next, we show that limn!1W n  V . By Proposition 3.3, for any set W 0, if the
set W 0 is a superset of V , then it holds that
B(W 0)  B(V ) = V
Thus, for any W 0, if W 0 is a superset of V , then it holds that B(W 0) \W 0  V .
Hence, if a setW n is a superset of the set V , then the setW n+1 is also a superset of
the set V . Hence, we obtain that W n  W for any n because the set W 0 is a superset
of the set V . Therefore, limn!1W n  V has been shown.
Let us consider a set R
 (
) and Euclidean distance over R
 (
).. Let us
denote by Cl(W ) the closure of the set W . The following lemma shows a property of
B(W ).
Lemma 3.1 Suppose that Assumption 3.1 is satised. If a set W is compact, then it
holds that Cl(B(W )) = B(W ).
Proof. Fix any convergent sequence (Rs; s)1s=1 such that, for any s 2 N, (Rs; s) 2 W .
We let R denote lims!1Rs and let  denote lims!1 s. For any s 2 N, there exist bs1,
bs2 and 
s such that (Rs; s) is decomposable over the setW with bs1, b
s
2 and 
s. For any
s and x and w, (!; x; w) is a continuation payo for type ! of player 1. Both the set of
action proles a and the set of types are nite. Hence, (!; x; w) is bounded from below
by the minimum expected stage-game payo u  min!2
mina2A u1(!; a) and bounded
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from above by the maximum expected payo u  max!2
maxa2A u1(!; a). Thus, the
sequence (bs1; b
s
2; 
s)1s=1 is a sequence in the compact set
 
(A1)

[0;1]  A[0;1]2   
[u; u]
[0;1]Y

. Therefore, we can choose the convergent subsequence (bs`1 ; b
s`
2 ; 
s`)1`=1.
We let b1 denote lim`!1 b
s`
1 , let b2 denote lim`!1 b
s`
2 and let by  denote lim`!1 
s` . By
construction and the upper hemicontinuity of the best response, (R; ) is decomposable
over W with b1, b2 and . Thus, we obtain (R; ) 2 W .
Finally, we show a compactness of the set V .
Proposition 3.4 Suppose that Assumption 3.1 is satised. The set V is compact.
Proof. By Proposition 3.3, we obtain V = B(V )  B(Cl(V )). By Lemma 3.1, it holds
that Cl(V )  Cl(B(Cl(V ))) = B(Cl(V )) because Cl(V ) is compact. Therefore, Cl(V )
is bounded and self-generating. Hence, we obtain Cl(V )  V . It holds that Cl(V )  V
by the denition of closure. Thus, we obtain Cl(V ) = V . Hence, it is proved that the
set V is compact.
3.5 Example : Participation game
In this section, we analyze a Participation game. The participation game is dened
as follows. There exist a rm (Player 1) and a consumer (Player 2). Player 1 decides
whether to exert high eort to provide a service for player 2 or not. Player 2 decides
whether to use the service or not. Player 1 and player 2 decide their actions simul-
taneously. If player 2 does not use the service (D), both players obtain payo 0. If
player 1 exerts high eort (H) and player 2 uses the service (U), then both players
obtain expected payo 1. If player 1 does not exert high eort (L) and player 2 uses
the service, then player 1 obtains expected payo 1 + c and player 2 obtains expected
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payo  1. The expected stage-game payo matrix is summarized as follows.
Participation game
Player 2
U D
Player 1
H 1; 1 0; 0
L 1 + c; 1 0; 0
Players observe a public signal. The set of public signals is given by Y  fyH ; yLg.
The distribution of public signal y is as follows.
(yH jH;U) =1  (yH jL;U) = p;
(yH jL;D) =(yH jH;D) = 1  q:
We assume that p > 1
2
. That is, when player 1 chooses action a1 and player 2 chooses
action U , a public signal ya1 , which corresponds to the action chosen by player 1, is
realized with high probability p(> 1
2
) and signal ya01 is realized with low probability 1 
p(< 1
2
). However, when player 2 chooses action D, the distribution of public signals
does not depend on player 1's action.
We consider an innitely repeated participation game. Player 1 is a rm with a
xed discount factor  2 [0; 1) and player 2 is a sequence of short-run consumers.
At the beginning of the innitely repeated game, Nature selects player 1's type from
f!; !0g. With probability  > 0, player 1 is a normal type (!) and he chooses an
action from fH;Lg in each period. With probability 1    > 0, player 1 is a bad
type (!0), and then the repetition of action L is a dominant-action of the innitely
repeated game. We assume that public randomization device is available.
We cannot use the results of Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) in the above partic-
ipation game. A strategy prole is Markov-private if each player's strategy depends
on his past private information only through his current private state. Given a game,
beliefs are said to be Markov if, for any Markov-private strategy prole, each player's
belief about the other players' states depend on his private information only through
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his current state, both on and o the equilibrium path. Cole and Kocherlakota (2001)
present a technique to derive a set of the equilibrium payo vectors and common priors
over the states in a game if beliefs are Markov in the game.
Beliefs are not Markov in the above participation game. Consider the following
strategies. Normal type chooses action H at any history, and bad type chooses ac-
tion L at any history. Player 2 chooses action D at any history. These strategies are
Markov-private. If player 2 plays action D and yH is realized in period 0, then pos-
terior belief over player 1's types in period 1 is equal to common prior over player 1's
types. However, if player 2 deviates to play action U and yH is realized in period 0,
then posterior belief over player 1's types in period 1 defers from common prior over
player 1's types. That is, it does not hold that player 2's beliefs about player 1's types
depends on his private information only through his current state. Thus, we cannot
use the results of Cole and Kocherlakota (2001).
We study the set of pairs of the equilibrium payo vectors and common priors
in which player 2's strategy is pure by using our results from Section 3.4. First, we
provide a candidate of the set of pairs of the equilibrium payo vectors and common
priors. Second, we show that the candidate is bounded and self-generating. Thus, it is
proved by Theorem 3.1 that the candidate is a subset of the set of pairs of equilibrium
payos and common priors.
The bad type is a commitment type. Therefore, we do not show the payo for
the bad type. We focus on payos of the normal type, and we consider a set of pairs
of equilibrium payos for normal type and a common prior probability with which
player 1 is normal type, W  R [0; 1].
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3.5.1 A candidate of the set of pairs of equilibrium payos
and common priors
First, to dene a candidate of the set of pairs of equilibrium payos and common
priors W , we dene  ;  and v as follows.
 1 +
p
1  42p(1  p)
2p
> 1
 1 
p
1  42p(1  p)
2p
< 1
v 1  1  p
2p  1c
Second, for any nonnegative integers N , we dene N ; N as a solution to the
following simultaneous linear equations.
1 + N 
N + N
N =(1  ) + pv + (1  p) 1 + N N 1 + NN 1 (3.5)
1 + N + N =(1  ) + p (1 + N + N) (3.6)
Let us dene vN : Z! R as follows.
vN(s) =
8>>>><>>>>:
v if s > N;
1 + N 
s + N
s; if 0  s  N;
0 if s < 0:
We dene N.
N min
8<:N 2 N [ f0g
 vN(s) is non-decreasing function of s, andv   V N(N)  1  c2p 1 :
9=;
In some games, the above set is empty. Then, there exists no nonnegative integer N.
Finally, we dene Is, E and W as follows, where Z denotes the set of integers.
Is 

ps
ps + (1  p)s ;
ps+1
ps+1 + (1  p)s+1

;
E f(v; )j Given , there exists pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which ! obtains payo v.g;
W f(v; )jv 2 [0; vN(s)] and  2 Is for some s 2 Zg:
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The set is W is well dened only if there exists N.
Given any  2 Is, when normal type chooses H and yH (resp. yL) is realized given
, then Bayesian updated  is in Is+1 (resp. Is 1). This statement is summarized as
follows.
Fact 3.1 If  2 Is, then it holds that
p
p+ (1  )(1  p) 2 Is+1; and
(1  p)
(1  p) + (1  )p 2 Is 1:
The expression p
p+(1 )(1 p) (resp.
(1 p)
(1 p)+(1 )p) is Bayesian updated  when the
normal type chooses H and yH (resp. yL) is realized.
If  2 Is for some negative integer s, then the short-run player's best response is
action D even if the normal type chooses action H. If  2 Is for some nonnegative
integer s, then the short-run player's best response is action U if and only if the normal
type chooses action H.
3.5.2 A subset of the set of pairs of equilibrium payos and
common priors
In general, we need a complicated proof to show that any element of the set W is a
pair of the equilibrium payo and common prior. However, our result enables us to
show it easily. In this subsection, we show that W  E by Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 3.5 Fix any discount factor  2 [0; 1). If there exists N, then W  E.
If there exists no N, then a set W is not well dened. To prove Proposition 3.5,
we show the following lemmas 3.2{3.3. We do not use public randomization to prove
the following lemmas. Hence, we omit public randomization x from the denitions of
T ; b;  for simplicity.
Using substitution of vN(s), we have the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.2 If there exists N, then it holds that
vN(s) =
8>>>><>>>>:
v if s > N;
(1  ) + pvN(s+ 1) + (1  p)vN(s  1) if 0  s  N;
0 if s < 0:
Proof. If s > N holds, then we obtain vN(s) = v by the denition of vN(s). If
s = N holds, then we obtain vN(s) = (1   ) + pvN(s + 1) + (1   p)vN(s   1)
by equation (3.5). In the same way, If s < 0 holds, then we obtain vN(s) = 0 by the
denition of vN(s). If s = 0 holds, then we obtain vN(s) = (1  ) + pvN(s+ 1) +
(1  p)vN(s  1) by equation (3.6). Finally, we consider s = 1; 2; : : : N   1.
(1  ) + pvN(s+ 1) + (1  p)vN(s  1)
=1 + p(N 
s+1 + N
s+1) + (1  p)(N s 1 + Ns 1)
=1 + N 
s + N
s:
The last equality follows from the fact that  and  are theolution of the following
quadratic formula.
px2 + (1  p) = x:
From the above lemma, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3 If there exists N, then, for any s 2 f0; 1; 2; : : : ; N   1g, it holds that
vN(s)  vN(s  1) > vN(s+ 1)  vN(s) > 1  

c
2p  1 :
Proof. By lemma 3.2, for any s 2 f0; 1; 2; : : : ; Ng, it holds that
vN(s) = (1  ) + pvN(s+ 1) + (1  p)vN(s  1):
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From the above equation, we have
vN(s+ 1)  vN(s) =1  p
p
(vN(s)  vN(s  1))  1  
p
(1  vN(s))
<vN(s)  vN(s  1):
The last inequality follows from p > 1
2
and vN(s)  v < 1. Hence, we obtain
vN(s)  vN(s  1) > vN(s+ 1)  vN(s).
If v   vN(N   1)  1  c2p 1 holds, then v   vN 1(N   1)  1  c2p 1 and
vN 1(s) is a nondecreasing function of s. This is a contradiction to the denition of
N. Therefore, by the denition of N, it holds that
v   vN(N   1) = vN(N)  vN(N   1) > 1  

c
2p  1 :
Using the previous lemma, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4 If there exists N, then, for any s 2 f0; 1; : : : g, it holds that
min

vN(s+ 1)  1  

c
2p  1 ; vN(s  1)

=
8><>:vN
(s+ 1)  1 

c
2p 1 if s > N
;
vN(s  1) if 0  s  N:
Proof. The function vN(s) is non-decreasing function of s. Hence, by Lemma 3.3, it
holds that
vN(s+ 1)  vN(s  1)  vN(s)  vN(s  1) > 1  

1
2p  1 ; 8s 2 f0; 1; 2; : : : ; N
g:
Hence, for any s 2 f0; 1; 2; : : : ; Ng, it holds that
min

vN(s+ 1)  1  

c
2p  1 ; vN(s  1)

= vN(s  1)
By the denition of N, it holds that, for any s 2 fN; N + 1; : : : g
vN(s+ 1)  vN(s) = v   vN(s)  1  

c
2p  1 :
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Hence, if there exists N, then, for any s 2 f0; 1; : : : g, it holds that
min

vN(s+ 1)  1  

c
2p  1 ; vN(s  1)

=
8><>:vN
(s+ 1)  1 

c
2p 1 if s > N
;
vN(s  1) if 0  s  N:
Player 1 prefers action H when (yH)  (yL)  1  c2p 1 holds. If it holds that
(yH) =vN(s+ 1); and
(yL) =min

vN(s+ 1)  1  

c
2p  1 ; vN(s  1)

;
then, it holds that (yH)   (yL)  1  c2p 1 . Hence, from Lemma 3.4, we have the
following fact.
Fact 3.2 If there exists N, then, for any nonnegative integer s 2 f0; 1; 2; : : : g and
for any  2 Is, it holds that if
b1(!
) =H; b1(!0) = L; b2 = U;
(yH) =vN(s+ 1); (yL) = min

vN(s+ 1)  1  

c
2p  1 ; vN(s  1)

;
then,
vN(s) =(1  ) + p(yH) + (1  p)(yB)
(1  )(1 + c) + (1  q)(yH) + (1  q)(yB);
b2 2 arg max
b22A2
u2(b1(!
); b2) + (1  )u2(b1(!0); b2);
((y); T (; y)) 2 W; 8y 2 Y ;
where T (; y) is Bayesian updated  when y is realized.
If  does not change irrespective of the public signals, then player 1 prefers the
dominant-action of the stage-game. Hence, we have the following fact.
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Fact 3.3 If there exists N, then, for any integer s 2 Z and for any  2 Is, it holds
that if
b1(!
) =b1(!0) = L; b2 = D; and
(yH) =(yL) = 0
then,
0 =(1  )0 + q(yH) + (1  q)(yB)
(1  )0 + q(yH) + (1  q)(yB);
b2 2 arg max
b22A2
u2(b1(!
); b2) + (1  )u2(b1(!0); b2);
((y); T (; y)) 2 W; 8y 2 Y ;
where T (; y) is Bayesian updating of  when y is realized.
Finally, we prove Proposition 3.5.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. For any nonnegative integer s 2 Z and for any  2 Is,
(vN(s); ) is decomposable over the set W by b1; b2 and  described in Fact 3.2.
In addition, we obtain that for any integer s 2 Z and for any  2 Is, (0; ) is
decomposable over the set W by b1; b2 and  described in Fact 3.3. Hence, for any
nonnegative integer s 2 Z, any (v; ) 2 [0; vN(s)]Is is decomposable over the setW
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by the following b1; b2;  and the following public randomization.
b1(!
; x) =
8><>:H; if x 
v
vN (s)
;
L; if x > v
vN (s)
;
b1(!0; x) =L;
b2(x) =
8><>:U; if x 
v
vN (s)
;
D; if x > v
vN (s)
;
(yH) =
8><>:vN
(s+ 1); if x  v
vN (s)
;
0; if x > v
vN (s)
;
(yL) =
8><>:min
n
vN(s+ 1)  1  c2p 1 ; vN(s  1)
o
; if x  v
vN (s)
;
0; if x > v
vN (s)
:
Hence, the set W is bounded and self-generating. Proposition 3.5 has been proved by
Theorem 3.1.
3.6 Extension to mixed strategies
We now briey describe how to extend the results of Section 3.4 to the set of pairs
of equilibrium payos and common priors in which 2 is not pure. The key idea in
Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 is that if 2 is pure, then player 1 can keep track of the
beliefs of short-run players on the equilibrium path. Hence, for any Nash equilibrium,
we can analyze any subgame on the equilibrium path as if it is a initial period given
some common prior.
Standard assumptions that are often made in reputation models ensure that player 1
can keep track of the beliefs of short-run players on the equilibrium path even if 2 is
not pure.
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3.6.1 Observability
Many studies (e.g., Ely et al. (2008) and Kaya (2009)) assume that the actions chosen
by a short-run players are observable to each player. In this subsection, we discuss
the way to extend our results to the case of mixed strategies under the following
assumption.
Assumption 3.2 Player 2's actions are observable.
If player 2's actions are observable, player 1 can know the action chosen by player 2.
Thus, player 1 can keep track of the beliefs of short-run players even if player 2 chooses
mixed action.
Let ht1 = (x
s; as; ys)t 1s=0 be a private history of player 1 at the beginning of period
t  1, and ht = (xs; as2; ys)t 1s=0 be a public history at the beginning of period t  1.
First, we consider the following variant of Proposition 3.1 including mixed strategies
under Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 3.2.
Proposition 3.6 Suppose that Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 3.2 are satised. Fix
common prior  2 (
) and a Nash equilibrium  = (1; 2). Then, there exists a
PE p in which U1;!(
p
1;!; 
p
2) = U1;!(1;!; 2) holds for any ! 2 
.
A sketch of the proof is as follows. Fix any Nash equilibrium . For any public
history ht on the equilibrium path of , we dene the public strategy p as follows.
p1;!(h
t; xt) 
Z
~h
t
12Ht1
1;!(~h
t
1; x
t)dg(~h
t
1j1;!; 2; ht; xt); 8! 2 
;
p2(h
t; x) 2(x):
For any public history ht o the equilibrium path of , we dene p1;!(h
t; xt)  a1 for
some a1 2 A1 and p2(ht; x) = A2 for some a2 2 A2.
By the construction of p2 and Assumption 3.1, any public history h
t o the equilib-
rium path of  never realizes whatever player 1 plays. Hence, the continuation strategy
of player 2 o the equilibrium path does not aect player 1's best response on the equi-
librium path of . In addition, the payo for player 2 in any period t is not aected
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by the continuation strategy o the equilibrium path because player 2 is a short-run
player. Therefore, we can use a similar argument in the proof of Proposition 3.1. We
obtain Proposition 3.6.
Finally, we discuss the rest of our results in Section 3.4 in mixed strategies under
Assumption 3.2. If player 2's actions are observable, then a new public signal (a2; y)
is realized instead of y itself in each period. This new public signal does not satisfy
Assumption 3.1. Given some Nash equilibrium, some public histories are o the equi-
librium path. However, these public history o the equilibrium path is realized if and
only if player 2 deviates in the past. In the same way as the proof in Section 3.3, we
ignore player 2's deviation because player 2 is short-run players and we focus on Nash
equilibria. Hence, we require Condition 3.4 in Denition 3.2 with respect to (a2; y)
only when b2 prescribes a2 with positive probability. Other conditions are the same as
Section 3.3 except that b2 is a function of [0; 1] to (A2). Then, we can use the same
proofs in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4.
3.6.2 Independence
Some studies analyze reputation models without Assumption 3.2. However, these
works analyze repeated games under the following assumption to ensure that player 1
can keep track of the belief of player 2 (e.g., Tadelis (1999) Mailath and Samuel-
son (2001)). In this section, we discuss our results including mixed strategies in such
reputation models.
Assumption 3.3 For any actions a2 and a
0
2, it holds that
(j; a2) = (j; a02):
Assumption 3.3 ensures that short-run players' action a2 contains no useful infor-
mation. Hence, player 2's best response is the same between two private histories that
induce the same public history. Given any Nash equilibrium , consider the following
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public strategy of player 2.
p2(h
t; xt) 
Z
~h
t
22Ht2
2(~h
t
2; x
t)dg(~h
t
2j; ht; xt):
That is, p2(h
t; xt) is an expectation of 2(h
t
2; x
t). In each period, player 2 chooses a
convex combination of mixed actions among best response given . Hence, p2 is a best
response to 1. By the construction of 
p
2, it holds that U1;!(
0
1;!; 
p
2) = U1;!(
0
1;!; 2)
for any ! and for any 0. We dene p1 in the same way as in the previous subsection.
Then, we have U1;!(
p
1;!; 
p
2) = U1;!(1;!; 
p
2) = U1;!(1;!; 2). Hence, 
p
1 is a best
response to p2 because  is a Nash equilibrium.
By the construction of p and Assumption 3.3, it holds that E[u2(; )jp; ht] =
E[u2(; )j; ht] for any a2 and ht. Hence, p2 is a best response to p1. It has been proved
that p is a PE. We obtain a variant of Proposition 3.1 including mixed strategies under
Assumption 3.1 and 3.3.
3.7 Conclusion
The technique in Abreu et al. (1990) is useful for studying the equilibrium payo
sets in innitely repeated games. In this chapter, we extend the idea to a range of
innitely repeated games with a long-run player who has a persistent type and a
sequence of short-run players. Most of studies on reputation models characterize the
bounds of the equilibrium payo set because it is dicult to analyze the set of the
equilibrium payos. However, we show the following two results about the set of pairs
of equilibrium payos and common priors.
First, we nd a technique of checking whether or not a set of payo vectors and
common priors is a subset of the set of pairs of equilibrium payos and common
priors (Theorem 3.1). It simplies proving that any element in a set is attainable as
a Nash equilibrium payo vector. This technique is the most useful when we have a
candidate for the set of pairs of the equilibrium payos and common priors. However,
sometimes, we have no candidate for the set of pairs of the equilibrium payos and
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common priors. Our second result is useful in such a situation. Theorem 3.2 gives us a
smaller superset of the set of pairs of the equilibrium payos and common priors from
a bounded superset of the set of pairs of the equilibrium payos and common priors.
We show that by iterating this operation, we can nd an arbitrary tight superset of
the set of pairs of equilibrium payos and common priors.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
In this section, we prove Proposition 3.1. First, we show that, for any pure strategy
Nash equilibrium, the actions chosen by short-run players on the equilibrium path are
common knowledge. Next, we prove Proposition 3.1.
Fix common prior  2 (
) and Nash equilibrium  = (1; 2) in which 2 is
pure. First, we dene public strategy p and, next we show that U1;!(
p
1;!; 
p
2) =
U1;!(1;!; 2) holds.
For any public history h^
t
= (x^s; y^s)t 1s=0 and public signal x^
t, we dene a sequence
of actions chosen by player 2 on the equilibrium path (a^s2)
t 1
s=0, as follows.
a^s2 =
8><>:2(h
0
2; x^
0) if s = 0;
2((x^
 ; a^2; y^
 )s 1=0; x^
s) if 0 < s < t:
That is, the sequence of actions chosen by short-run players is generated by a pub-
lic history and a sunspot so that it is common knowledge on the equilibrium path.
It means that each player can keep track of the beliefs of short-run players on the
equilibrium path.
Then, we can dene p2 as follows.
p2(h^
t
; x^) =
8><>:2(h
0
2; x^) if t = 0
2((x^
s; a^s2; y^
s)t 1s=0; x^) if t 2 N:
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For any strategy prole ~ and for any t 2 f0g [ N, let f(!; xt; yt; ht1; ht2; htj~) be the
probability measure on 
 [0; 1] Y Ht1 Ht2 Ht given ~. For any t 2 f0g [ N,
let supp(Hti) be a support of private history hti given the strategy prole . By
the construction of p2, it holds that 
p
2(h
t
2; ) = 2(ht2; ) for any ht2 2 supp(Ht2).
Therefore, for any player 1's strategy ~1 and for any z 2 
 [0; 1]Y Ht1Ht2Ht,
it holds that
f(zj~1; p2) = f(zj~1; 2): (3.7)
This means that the behavior of short-run players does not aect the long-run player's
payo because for any long run player's strategy, short run players' strategies p2 and
2 generate the same distribution of z.
By the full support assumption, any public history h 2 H is realized with positive
probability. Hence, for any t, the conditional probability measure g on Hti given , ht
and xt is well-dened. We dene public strategy p1;! as follows.
p1;!(h
t; xt) 
Z
~h
t
12Ht1
1;!(~h
t
1; x
t)dg(~h
t
1j1;!; p2; ht; xt); 8! 2 
:
It implies that p1;!(h
t; xt) is the expected value of 1;!(~h
t
i; x
t) 2 (A1). For any t, we
dene the conditional probability measure e on the set of yt; xt+1; at+11 given , h
t and
xt.
By the construction of the strategy p1, for any t 2 f0g [ N, ht 2 Ht, x 2 [0; 1],
a1 2 A1, and y 2 Y , it holds that,
e(yt; xt+1; at+11 jp1;!; p2; ht; xt) = e(yt; xt+1; at+11 j1;!; p2; ht; xt)
For any t, we dene the probability measure ` on the set of ht; xt; at1 induced by .
We show that, for any ! 2 
, and for any t 2 f0g [ N, it holds that
`(ht; xt; at1jp1;!; p2) = `(ht; xt; at1j1;!; p2); 8ht 2 Ht; 8xt 2 [0; 1]; 8a1 2 A1 (3.8)
We obviously obtain that (3.8) holds for t = 0. If (3.8) holds for t = n, then (3.8)
holds for t = n + 1, as follows. For any t, let us dene the probability measure ~t on
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the set of ht and xt induced by . Then, ~t(ht; xtjp1;!; p2) = ~t(ht; xtj1;!; p2). Hence,
`((ht  (xt; yt)); xt+1; at+11 jp1;!; p2) =~t(ht; xtjp1;!; p2)e(yt; xt+1; at+11 jp1;!; p2; ht; xt)
=~t(ht; xtj1;!; p2)e(yt; xt+1; at+11 j1;!; p2; ht; xt)
=`((ht  (xt; yt)); xt+1; at+11 j1;!; p2):
Thus, it is shown that (3.8) holds for any t 2 f0g[N. By (3.7) and (3.8), it holds that
max
~1;!
U1;!(~1;!; 
p
2) = max
~1;!
U1;!(~1;!; 2) = U1;!(1;!; 2) = U1;!(
p
1;!; 2) = U1;!(
p
1;!; 
p
2):
Therefore, public strategy p1;! is the best response to 
p
2.
Next, we show that p2(h
t) is a player 2's best response for any ht 2 H. By (3.7)
and (3.8), for any t 2 f0g [ N, ht 2 Ht, x 2 [0; 1] and at2 2 A2, it holds that
E

u2(; at2)jp1; p2; ht; x

=E

u2(; at2)j1; p2; ht; x

= E

u2(; at2)j1; 2; ht; x

:
We obtain that p2 is the best response to 
p
1 because 2 is the best response to 1.
Then, the strategy prole p is a PE and U1;!(
p
1;!; 
p
2) = U1;!(1;!; 2) for any ! 2 
.
Proposition 3.1 has been proved.
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Chapter 4
Reputation and limited memory
lead cooperative relationship
4.1 Introduction
We analyze reputation models: that is, innitely repeated games with a long-
run player, who has private information, and a sequence of short-run players. In
most studies that analyze such innitely repeated games, players are assumed to have
unlimited memories. That is, short-run players can store all the information that
they observed in the past. On the other hand, we assume that short- run players
have limited memories. That is, each short-run player can observe signals in the xed
number of previous periods. We focus on equilibria that satisfy a certain condition,
and compare the equilibria under the assumption of limited memories with those under
the standard assumption of unlimited memories.
To be more specic, we consider innitely repeated games with imperfect public
monitoring in which each short run player can observe only public signals in the xed
number of previous periods. We consider a normal type and a bad type as long-run
player's types. A normal type can choose his action without any restriction in each
period. A Bad type commits to the stage-game Nash equilibrium action.
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The assumption of limited memories has two eects on reputation. One is that
reputation may be more fragile than under the assumption of unlimited memories. This
is because even if relatively many good signals were realized in the past, when a short-
run player has limited memory and has observed a few bad signals in recent periods,
she believes that the long-run player is a bad type. The other eect is that reputation
is recovered more easily than under the assumption of unlimited memories. This is
because, under the assumption of limited memories, if a short-run player observes
relatively few good signals, then she may believe that the long-run player is a normal
type even when many bad signals were realized in the past.
We focus on the following feature of reputation. Imagine a relationship between a
rm and consumers. When consumers believe that the rm produces a good product
with similar probabilities, they choose similar actions. Conjecturing such short-run
player's behavior, the rm also chooses similar actions when short-run players believe
that the rm produces a good product with similar probabilities. That is, players
choose similar actions when short-run players have similar beliefs.
To capture the feature of reputation, we focus on a class of equilibrium strategies:
each player chooses a similar mixed action when a short-run player in a period has
a similar belief as a short-run player in another period. This strategies are more
restrictive than Markov strategies shown in Mailath and Samuelson (2001): if a short-
run player in a period has the same belief as a short-run player in another period, then
the players choose the same mixed actions. Our strategy captures the above feature
of reputation, although Markov strategy cannot because it does not restrict players'
action when short-run players have dierent beliefs.
An equilibrium is said to be trivial if a stage-game Nash equilibrium action prole
is chosen in each period on the equilibrium path. If short-run players have unlimited
memories, then they keep track innitely long sequences of public signals. Hence,
information contained in recent public signals becomes relatively small to the total in-
formation contained in the sequence as time goes by. Thus, players do not change their
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behavior at innity because the beliefs of short-run players do not change depending
on the recent signals. Therefore, the long-run player has a strong incentive to choose
a dominant action of the stage-game because continuation play does not aected by
recent public signals. This is a trivial equilibrium.
In contrast to the case of unlimited memory, if short-run players have limited mem-
ories, information of recent public signals might not become small at innity. This is
because, short-run player can store only nite public signals. In such a situation, short-
run players change their actions depending on recent public signals, and it generates
an incentive for the long-run player to choose an dominated action of the stage-game.
We show that there exists a nontrivial equilibrium in which the long-run player chooses
a dominated action of the stage-game to keep his reputation.
Typical models in the literature on reputation (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992),
Cripps et al. (2004, 2007)) assume unlimited memories. In some cases, however, the
standard assumption of unlimited memories may not be plausible. Consider an online
shop and its web-based customer reviews. There are typically many customer reviews
for each product. However, online shops show only nite reviews in top page of each
product page. (For example, Amazon.com shows six reviews on each product page.)
Hence, many customers decide whether or not to buy the product based on only a
nite number of reviews. In such a situation, the assumption of limited memories is
more plausible.
There exist some previous studies about reputation under the assumption of limited
memories: Liu (2011), Monte (2013) and Liu and Skrzypacz (2014). They consider
innitely repeated games with perfect monitoring. That is, players can observe the
action chosen by the opponent player without monitoring error. They assume Stack-
elberg type as a commitment type. A Stackelberg type commits to an action that the
long-run player is most likely to commit to. On the other hand, we consider a bad
type as a commitment type.
Liu (2011) considers costly information acquisition. In his model, if short-run
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players pay a cost, then they can observe the long-run player's actions in the previous
periods whose length depends on their payments. He nds a unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which short-run players observe public signal in the nite numbers of
previous periods, and characterizes it. Thus, we can interpret the model in Liu (2011)
as an endogenous limited memory model.
Liu and Skrzypacz (2014) consider a limited memory model. They show an equi-
librium in which (i) the long-run player mimics a Stackelberg type with a positive
probability to build a good reputation if short-run players doubt that he is a normal
type, and (ii) he chooses a strictly dominant action in the stage-game if short-run
players strongly believe that he is a Stackelberg type. On the other hand, we show an
equilibrium in which the long- run player does not choose the strictly dominant action
of the stage-game at any history.
The above two papers assume that short-run players cannot observe calendar time.
When short-run players can observe calendar time, their beliefs change in complicated
ways depending on calendar time and the analyses are dicult. We and Monte (2013)
consider a limited memory model in which short-run players observe calendar time.
Monte (2013) analyzes innitely repeated zero-sum games in which short-run players
can observe calendar time. He studies the beliefs of short-run players in the equilib-
rium. He shows that short-run players never know a long-run player's true type in any
equilibrium. We also assume that short-run players can observe calendar time and
show a nontrivial sequential equilibrium, although Monte (2013) shows the properties
of short-run players' beliefs instead of the nontrivial equilibrium itself.
There exist only a few models that assume a bad type as a commitment type:
Mailath and Samuelson (2001), Ely and Valimaki (2003) and Ely et al. (2008). Mailath
and Samuelson (2001) assume unlimited memory and an impermanent type, whose
type is replaced with a positive probability in each period. On the other hand, we
consider limited memory and permanent type, whose type does not change throughout
a play. Mailath and Samuelson (2001) focus on a Markov strategy in which the state
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space is the short-run player's belief about the long-run player's type. They show an
equilibrium in which a normal type chooses a dominated action of the stage-game in
each period in order to change the short-run player's belief.
Ely and Valimaki (2003) conducted a seminal work on the bad reputation game.
Ely et al. (2008) generalize Ely and Valimaki (2003) and consider games in which
short-run players have an option about whether to deal with the long-run player who
can choose a deceiving action to look good in the current period. Ely et al. (2008)
call the generalized games bad reputation games. Our model is not a bad reputation
game because the stage-game in this chapter has no deceiving actions. We restrict the
player's equilibrium strategy and nd that the unique equilibrium is the repetition of
the stage-game Nash equilibrium.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Sec-
tion 4.2. Section 4.3 studies reputation under unlimited memory and Section 4.4
studies reputation under limited memory. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Model
We consider the following stage-game. There are two players, player 1 and player 2.
Let Ai  f0; 1; : : : ; kig be the nite set of actions. Let ui(a1; a2) be the expected
stage-game payo of player i given action prole (a1; a2) 2 A1  A2. We assume that
the expected stage-game payos satisfy the following assumptions.1
Assumption 4.1 For any a2 2 A2, the payo of player 1, u1(a1; a2), is strictly de-
creasing in a1 2 A1 and, for any a1, u1(a1; a2), is increasing in a2.
That is, Assumption 4.1 implies that, in the stage-game, player 1 has a dominant
action 0. In addition, for any a1, u1(a1; a2) is the greatest when a2 = k2 holds.
Assumption 4.2 Fix any distribution functions on player 1's action F and F 0. If F
has rst-order stochastic dominance over F 0, then the maximal element of player 2's
1The product-choice game dened in Mailath and Samuelson (2006) satises these Assumptions.
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best reply to F is not smaller than the maximal element of player 2's best reply to F 0.
For any pure action a1 2 A1, player 2 has the unique best reply a2(a1), such that
a2(k1) = k2 and a

2(0) = 0.
Assumption 4.2 implies that if player 1's mixed actions are ordered in the sense of
rst-order stochastic dominance, then player 2's best responses to the mixed actions
are monotonic. In addition, if player 1 chooses pure action, then player 2 has a unique
best reply. Assumption 4.1 and Assumption 4.2 imply that the stage-game has a
unique Nash equilibrium.
Players cannot observe directly the opponent player's action, but, they can observe
the same noisy signals. When an action prole (a1; a2) is chosen, a public signal y
is realized with a probability (yja1; a2) and observed by both players. Let a set
Y = fy0; y2; : : : ; ykg  R be the set of all public signals we assume that ys < ys+1
holds for any natural number s(< k). We make the following assumptions on the
distribution of public signals .
Assumption 4.3 (Probability distribution independence) For any a1 2 A1,
there exists pa1 2 (0; 1) such that
(yja1; a2) =pa1(y) 2 (0; 1); 8a2 2 A2:
Assumption 4.3 ensures that for any action prole a 2 A, any public signal y
is realized with positive probability (full support assumption). Assumption 4.3 may
seem to be restrictive. However, the following situations are conceivable. Consider
an Amazon review. Suppose that several consumers bought a book from Amazon. It
takes a long time to nish reading the book and they forget how much they paid for
the book when they review the book. In such a situation, this assumption is plausible.
Assumption 4.4 (Monotone likelihood ratio property) If a1 < a
0
1, then
pa1 (y)
pa01
(y)
is
a decreasing function on y.
Let i(ai; y) be the player i's stage-game payo from an action ai and a public
signal y. Player i's payo depends only on what player i knows because each player
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can observe only his own action and a public signal. Therefore, this payo i(ai; y)
provides no additional information about the action chosen by the opponent player.
Then, we let ui(a1; a2) =
P
y2Y i(ai; y)(yja1; a2) denote the ex ante stage payo for
player i.
We consider an innitely repeated game where the stage-game is dened above.
Players play the stage-game in period t = 0; 1; : : : under incomplete information.
Player 1 is a long-run player with a discount factor  2 [0; 1). Player 2 is a succession
of short-run players who live for one period. We suppose that player 1 has a type. Let
us denote a normal type by ! and a bad type by !0. Let 
  f!; !0g be the set
of all possible types. At the beginning of the innitely repeated game, Nature selects
player 1's type according to a common prior. With a probability  2 (0; 1), player 1
is a normal type. With a probability 1   , player 1 is a bad type. A normal type
can choose an action from A1 in every period. On the other hand, a bad type chooses
action 0 in every period. Player 1's type is his private information and this does not
change throughout a play of the innitely repeated game.
Player 1 can observe a sequence of actions chosen by player 1 and public signals.
Player 1 cannot observe player 2's actions.2 For t  1, we let ht1 = (as1; ys)t 1s=0 2
(A1  Y )t denote the private history of player 1 at the beginning of period t.
Player 2 can observe only a sequence of public signals in a xed number of periods.
It is said that player 2 has m-memory if, for any t  1, the private history of player 2
at period t, ht2, is a sequence of realized public signals from period maxf0; t  mg to
t  1: that is, ht2 = (ys)t 1s=maxf0;t mg 2 Y minft;mg. The natural number m is referred as
memory size. If memory size is nite, then player 2 is said to have limited memory,
and if memory size is innite, then player 2 is said to have unlimited memory. If
player 2 has m-memory, then for any t  1, a private history of player 2, ht2, is
common knowledge between player 1 and player 2 in period t. Therefore, for any
2This assumption is for simplicity of exposition. Even if player 1 can observe player 2's action,
our results do not change.
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t  1, we regard private history ht2 as a public history. For any private history of
player 1, ht1 = (a
s
1; y
s)t 1s=0 2 (A1Y )t, let us dene z(ht1) as the public history induced
by ht1. That is, z(h
t
1) = (y
s)t 1s=maxf0;t mg = h
t
2.
Given memory size m, let Hti be the set of all possible player i's private histories
in period t( 1) and let Hi be the set of all possible player i's private histories. For
any i, let H0i be an arbitrary singleton set.
Player 1's strategy 1 is a function that assigns a probability distribution over
A1 to each pair of type and private history of player 1. A bad type is assumed to
commit to action 0. The strategy of player 2 in period t, t2, is a function that assigns
a probability distribution over A2 to each private history of player 2. Let us dene
player 2's strategy by 2  (t2)1t=0. We denote the strategy prole by  = (1; 2).
Given a sequence of action proles (at1; a
t
2)
1
t=0, the average discounted payo to a
normal type with a discount factor  2 [0; 1) is given by
(1  )
1X
t=0
tu1(a
t
1; a
t
2):
A normal type maximizes the expected average discounted stage-game payo given
strategy of player 2. Player 2 in period t maximizes the expected stage-game payo
in period t.
A strategy prole  = (1; 2) and a common prior  produce a probability dis-
tribution over the set of player 1's types and all sequences of private histories. Let
t2(!; (h
s
1; h
s
2)
t 1
s=0jht2; ) be player 2's belief about player 1's type and private histories
given player 2's private history ht2 and strategy prole . Let 
t
1((h
s
2)
t 1
s=0j!; ht1; ) be
player 1's belief about player 2s' private histories given player 1's type, private his-
tory ht1 and . We let i  (ti )1t=0 denote a system of beliefs of player i, and we
dene   (1; 2). We do not explicitly refer to player 1's beliefs because they are
determined uniquely by Bayes' rule.
Let ht1h1 be the concatenation of player 1's private history ht1 followed by player 1's
private history h1.
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Denition 4.1 For any strategy of player 1, 1, player 1's strategy 1jht1 is player 1's
continuation strategy induced by ht1, if strategy 1jht1 satises that
1jht1(!; h1) = 1(!; ht1  h1); 8! 2 
; 8h1 2 H1:
A strategy prole is completely mixed if every action prole is selected with positive
probabilities at any history. Given a strategy prole , a system of beliefs is consistent
if there exists a sequence of completely mixed strategy proles converging to  such
that the corresponding sequence of the system of beliefs, obtained from Bayes' rule,
converges to it.
We use sequential equilibrium as a solution concept.
Denition 4.2 A strategy prole  is a sequential equilibrium if there exists a belief
system  satisfying the following two conditions.
1. Sequential Rationality: For any t and for any ht1, player 1's continuation strategy
induced by ht1, 1jht1 , is a best response given . For any t and for any ht2, the
strategy of player 2 in period t, t2(h
t
2), is a best response given .
2. Consistency of Belief System: A belief system  is consistent with strategy pro-
le .
In the next assumption, we dene a class of strategies on which we focus. Let us
denote t2(!jht2) as player 2's belief about player 1's type given a player 2's private
history and a strategy prole  where we suppress  from t2.
We focus on a strategy prole in which arbitrary small changes in reputation do
not aect players' behaviors in the following sense.
Assumption 4.5 For any  > 0, there exists  > 0, such that, for any ht1; h
t0
1 2 H1,
it holds that 3
jt2(!jz(ht1))  t
0
2 (!
jz(ht01 ))j <  )
8<: jj1(!; ht1)  1(!; ht
0
1 )jj < ;
jj2(z(ht1))  2(z(ht01 ))jj < :
3jjxjj denotes the max norm of x.
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An interpretation of Assumption 4.5 is as follows. Let us consider a rm (a long-
run player) and consumers (short-run players). Consumers do not change their buying
behavior depending on arbitrary small changes in reputation. If a rm has good
reputation, then consumers continue to buy a product from the rm even if they buy
a bad quality one only once.
Assumption 4.5 is more restrictive than the Markov strategy assumption in Mailath
and Samuelson (2001). The Markov strategy restricts players' behaviors only when
short-run players have the same belief, and does not restrict players' behaviors if
short-run players have dierent beliefs.
In what follows, a strategy prole  is said to be an equilibrium if it is a sequential
equilibrium and satises Assumption 4.5. We call the equilibrium trivial if players play
a stage-game Nash equilibrium on the equilibrium path in each period. An equilibrium
is nontrivial if it is not trivial.
4.3 Unlimited memories
In this section, we analyze a model with unlimited memory as a benchmark. We show
that if short-run players have unlimited memories, a unique equilibrium is a repetition
of stage-game Nash equilibrium action prole (0; 0). In the following, we show the
sketch of the proof of the statement by contradiction.
Let us consider a situation where short-run players have unlimited memories. Fix
any nontrivial equilibrium . We dene H^t1 and 2 as follows:
H^t1 

ht1 2 Ht1 j 1(ht1)(0) < 1 and ht1 is on the equilibrium path.
	
;
2  sup
n
x 2 [0; 1]
x = t2(!jz(ht1)) for some t and h^t1 2 H^t1o :
There exist two cases for 2. One is the case of 2 < 1 and the other is the case
of 2 = 1. We explain the rst case. The second case is discussed in the proof. Fix
2(< 1) and suppose a private history h
t
1 2 H^t1 that satises t2(!jz(ht1)) = 2. By the
denition of H^t1, it holds that t2(!jz(ht1)yk) > 2 and this contradicts the denition
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of 2. Thus, there exists no private history h
t
1 that satises 
t
2(!
jz(ht1)) = 2, and for
any " > 0, there exists ht1 such that 2   t2(!jz(ht1)) < ".
Fix  > 0 and " 2 (0; ). First, we x  2 (0; 1) such that (1 )(p0(y0) p1(y0)) <
". Next, we x "0 > 0, such that
2  
(2   "0)(p0(yk) + (1  )p1(yk))
(2   "0)(p0(yk) + (1  )p1(yk)) + (1  (2   "0))p0(yk)
< 0:
Consider a private history ht1 2 H^t1, such that 2   t2(!jz(ht1)) < "0. If player 1 does
not choose action 0 with more than probability  at the public history z(ht1), then it
holds that
2   t+12 (!jz(ht1)  yk) <2  
t2(!
jz(ht1))(p0(yk) + (1  )p1(yk))
t2(!
jz(ht1))(p0(yk) + (1  )p1(yk)) + (1  t2(!jz(ht1)))p0(yk)
<0
That is, t+12 (!
jz(ht1)  yk) > 2. It is a contradiction of the denition of 2. Thus,
normal type chooses action 0 with at least probability  at public history z(ht1). Then,
it holds that
t2(!
jz(ht1))  t2(!jz(ht1)  y0)
<
t2(!
jz(ht1))(1  t2(!jz(ht1)))
t2(!
jz(ht1)) fp0(y0) + (1  )p1(y0)g+ (1  t2(!jz(ht1)))p0(y0)
(1  )(p0(y0)  p1(y0))
<"
Hence, we have jt2(!jz(ht1)  y)   t2(!jz(ht1))j < "(< ) for any y. It implies
that 2 t+12 (!jz(ht1)y) < 2 and we can use the similar argument holds for public
history z(ht1)  y.
For any  > 0, " > 0 and k, we consider the same argument to public history ht1 2
H^t1 and (ys)ks=1. Using the above discussion repeatedly, we have 2   t+k2 (!jz(ht1) 
(ys)ks=1) < 2
k for any k and (ys)ks=1. Hence, for any k
0; k00  k, (~ys)k0s=1 and (y^s)k00s=1, we
have jt+k02 (!jz(ht1)(~ys)k0s=1) t+k
00
2 (!
jz(ht1)(y^s)k00s=1)j < 2k. If  converges to zero,
then players chooses the same mixed actions for any ht1  (ys)ks=1 by Assumption 4.5.
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That is, for any ht1, the continuation strategy prole induced by z(h
t
1)  y does not
change depending on y at least k periods. Therefore, normal type has a strong incentive
to choose the dominant-action of the stage-game 0 at ht1 in order to maximize the
stage-game payo. It is a contradiction to ht1 2 H^t1. We nd that  is not nontrivial.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that Assumption 4.1-4.5 hold and short run players have
limited memories For any discount factor  2 [0; 1), there exists no nontrivial equilib-
rium.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
4.4 Limited memories
If short-run players have limited memories, short-run player cannot observe old signals.
Hence, information of recent public signals does not become small as time goes by.
Thus, short-run players might change their actions depending on the previous signals.
Then, the long-run player has an incentive to choose action k1 to keep his reputation.
In this section, we show that there exists an equilibrium in which the long-run
player does not choose the dominant-action of the stage-game to keep his reputation
under the assumption of limited memories. To be more specic, we show that there
exists an equilibrium in which the normal type chooses action k1 at any history.
We also impose the following assumption.
Assumption 4.6 (Monotonicity of payo) If a1 > a
0
1 holds, then it holds that
u1(a1; a

2(a1)) > u1(a
0
1; a

2(a
0
1)).
This assumption determines which actions player 1 would most like to publicly
commit. The above assumption ensures that player 1 prefers the largest action if he
could publicly commit to.
Let Fa1(y) be a distribution function on Y , given a1. The following proposition
holds.
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Proposition 4.2 Suppose that Assumptions 4.1-4.6 hold and short-run players have
m-memories. Assume that the following conditions (4.1){(4.3) are satised:
1.
k2 2 argmax
a2
pk1(yk)
mu2(k1; a2) + (1  )p0(yk)mu2(0; a2)
pk1(yk)
m + (1  )p0(yk)m ; (4.1)
0 2 argmax
a2
pk1(y0)
mu2(k1; a2) + (1  )p0(y0)mu2(0; a2)
pk1(y0)
m + (1  )p0(y0)m ; (4.2)
2.
max
a22A2
fu1(0; a2)  u1(k1; a2)g <m+1

min
y2Y
pk1(y)
m 1
fu1(k1; 1)  u1(k1; 0)g


min
a12A1nfk1g
min
y2Y nfykg
fFa1(y)  Fk1(y)g

(4.3)
Then, there exists an equilibrium in which, player 1 chooses action k1 at any private
history ht1.
Proof. See Appendix B.2
We explain Proposition 4.2 by example. Suppose that m = 1, A1 = A2 = f0; 1g
and Y = fy0; y1g. Then, we can rewrite conditions (4.1){(4.3) in Proposition 4.2 as
follows.
1 2 argmax
a2
p1(y1)u2(1; a2) + (1  )p0(y1)u2(0; a2)
p1(y1) + (1  )p0(y1) ; (4.4)
0 2 argmax
a2
p1(y0)u2(1; a2) + (1  )p0(y0)u2(0; a2)
p1(y0) + (1  )p0(y0) ; (4.5)
max
a22A2
fu1(0; a2)  u1(1; a2)g <
2 fu1(1; 1)  u1(1; 0)g  (p1(y1)  p0(y1)): (4.6)
Hence, Condition 1 in Proposition 4.2 ensures that the short-run players' best response
is 1 if the previous public signal is y1, and it is 0 if the previous public signal is y0.
That is, the short-run players' best responses change depending on the previous public
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signals. Condition 2 in Proposition 4.2 ensures that player 1's deviation to action 0
from action 1 is not protable.
We examine whether there exists an equilibrium prole  in which, at any private
history ht1, player 1 chooses action 1, or not. Fix 1 such that at any private history h
t
1,
player 1 chooses action 1. Fix 2 such that player 2 chooses action 1 if and only if the
previous public signal is y1. We show that (1; 2) is an equilibrium.
Let v1(y) be the continuation payo of the normal type given a public signal y.
The continuation payo v1(yi) is given by
v1(yi) =(1  )u1(1; i) + p1(y1)v1(y1) + (1  p1(y1))v(y0):
Let vd1(yi) be the payo when the previous public signal is yi and player 1 deviates to
action 0.
vd1(yi) =(1  )u1(0; i) + p0(y1)v1(y1) + (1  p0(y1))v1(y0)
Hence, for any yi, it holds that
v1(yi)  vd1(yi)
=(1  )fu1(1; i)  u1(0; i)g+ (p1(y1)  p0(y1))(v1(y1)  v1(y0))
=  (1  )fu1(0; i)  u1(1; i)g+ (1  )(p1(y1)  p0(y1))fu1(1; 1)  u1(1; 0)g
>(1  )

 fu1(0; i)  u1(1; i)g+ max
a22A2
fu1(0; a2)  u1(1; a2)g

0:
The strict inequality comes from Condition 2. Hence, 1 is a best response to 2.
Condition 1 ensures that 2 is a best response to 1. Therefore, the strategy (1; 2)
is a sequential equilibrium.
Next, we show that strategy (1; 2) satises Assumption 4.5. A normal type
chooses action 1 at any history. Hence, if previous signal is y1 (resp. y0), then short-
run player has a belief p1(y1)
p1(y1)+(1 )p0(y1) (resp.
p1(y0)
p1(y0)+(1 )p0(y0)). Thus, the following
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three kinds of beliefs are realized on the equilibrium path.
p1(y1)
p1(y1) + (1  )p0(y1) ; ;
p1(y0)
p1(y0) + (1  )p0(y0) :
The second one is a common prior.
We dene  as follows.
  min

p1(y1)
p1(y0) + (1  )p0(y0)   ;  
p1(y0)
p1(y1) + (1  )p0(y1)

:
By the denition of , for any ht1 and h
t0
1 , if jt2(!jz(ht1))   t02 (!jz(ht01 ))j < , then
z(ht1) = z(h
t0
1 ) holds. Thus, for any  > 0, the strategy (1; 2) satises Assump-
tion 4.5.
Finally, we consider a relation between memory size and Conditions 1 and 2 in
Proposition 4.2. Condition 1 is not satised if memory size is small. This is because
if memory size is small, then short-run player can observe only a small number of
public signals and the beliefs of short-run players do not change suciently enough to
change their best response. Condition 2 is not satised if memory size is large. This
is because, if many public signals y0 are realized in the past and memory size is large,
it takes a long time to recover his reputation. Then, it does not pay for player 1 to
choose action k1 in order to recover his reputation. Hence, we can use Proposition 4.2
if memory size is neither too small nor too large. Thus, players can maintain good
relationshiops in the long-run for moderate memory size.
4.5 Conclusion
In section 4.3, we have shown that if short-run players have unlimited memories, the
unique equilibrium is a repetition of a stage-game Nash equilibrium action prole,
which is Pareto inecient. That is, if short-run players have unlimited memories,
then players do not choose cooperative behavior. In Section 4.4, we have shown that
if short-run players have limited memories, then there exists a nontrivial equilibrium
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in which a normal type chooses action k1 at any history. In other words, if short-
run players have limited memories, then players choose cooperative behavior in some
equilibrium. Limited memories sometimes increase the incentive of the long-run player
to choose action k1 at any history in order to keep his reputation, so that it is good
not only for the normal type, but also for short-run players.
Appendix
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof of Proposition 4.1. We prove Proposition 4.1 by contradiction. Fix any non-
trivial equilibrium . We x an increasing sequence of natural numbers (`s)
1
s=1 and a
sequence of private histories (h^`s1 )
1
s=1, such that
lim
s!1
`s2 (!
jz(h^`s1 )) = 2(> );
`s2 (!
jz(h^`s1 )) < 2; 8s 2 N; and
h^`s1 2 H^`s1 ; 8s 2 N:
In what follows, we show that, there exists a natural number s for which a normal
type's unique best response is 0 at private history h^`s1 .
First, we consider a case where 2 = 1 holds. We x  and T , such that
min
a22A2
fu1(0; a2)  u1(1; a2)g > 2(1  
T )
1    fu1(0; k2)  u1(k1; 0)g+ 
T+1 fu1(0; k2)  u1(k1; 0)g :
For any (> 0), we x s that satises
`s2 (!
jz(h^`s1 )) f(y0jk1)gT+1
`s2 (!
jz(h^`s1 )) f(y0jk1)gT+1 + (1  `s2 (!jz(h^`s1 ))) f(y0j0)gT+1
> 1  :
Then, it holds that
1  (`s)+t02 (!jz(h^`s1  ht
0
1 )) < ; 8ht
0
1 2 Ht
0
1 ; 8t0 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T + 1g: (4.7)
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It ensures that
j(`s)2 (!jz(h^`s1 )  (`s)+t
0
2 (!
jz(h^`s1  ht
0
1 ))j < ; 8ht
0
1 2 Ht
0
1 ; 8t0 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T + 1g:
(4.8)
Hence, it holds under Assumption 4.5 that there exists  > 0 and the corresponding
s such that for any t0 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T + 1g, and for any ht01 2 Ht01 ,u1(1(!; h^`s1 ); 2(z(h^`s1 )))  u1(1(!; h^`s1  ht01 ); 2(z(h^`s1  ht01 )))
< fu1(0; k2)  u1(k1; 0)g : (4.9)
Let us denote by v1(a1; h
t
1) the continuation payo when the normal type chooses
a one-shot deviation from 1 to an action a1 at private history h
t
1. Based on inequal-
ity (4.9), the continuation payos v1(a1; h^
`s
1 ) and v1(0; h^
`s
1 ) satisfy that
v1(a1; h^
`s
1 ) <(1  )u1(a1; 2(z(h`s1 )))
+ (1  T )
h
u1(1(!
; h^`s1 ); 2(z(h^
`s
1 ))) +  fu1(0; k2)  u1(k1; 0)g
i
+ T+1(1  )u1(0; k2); 8a1 2 A1nf0g;
v1(0; h^
`s
1 ) >(1  )u1(0; 2(z(h`s1 )))
+ (1  T )
h
u1(1(!
; h^`s1 ); 2(z(h^
`s
1 )))   fu1(0; k2)  u1(k1; 0)g
i
+ T+1(1  )u1(k1; 0):
Therefore, for any a1 2 A1nf0g, it holds that
v1(a1; h^
`s
1 )  v1(0; h^`s1 )
1  
< 

min
a22A2
fu1(0; a2)  u1(1; a2)g

+ 2
(1  T )
1    fu1(0; k2)  u1(k1; 0)g+ 
T+1 fu1(0; k2)  u1(k1; 0)g
<0:
It is proved that there exists a natural number s such that the normal type's unique
best response is action 0 at private history h^
`s
1 when 2 = 1.
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Next, we consider a case where 2 < 1 holds. Suppose that lims!1 1(!
; h^`s1 )(0) 6=
1. Fix a suciently large s. When a public signal yk is realized given a private history
h^`s1 , then the belief 
(`s)+1
2 (!
jz(h^`s1 )yk) is greater than 2 because lims!1 1(!; h^`s1 )(0) 6=
1 and lims!1 `s2 (!
jz(h^`s1 )) = 2. We nd that player 1's strategy satises lims!1 1(!; h^`s1 )(0) =
1. Hence, for any T 2 N, there exists s 2 N, such that
2(z(h^
`s
1  ht
0
1 ))(0) = 1; 8ht
0
1 2 Ht
0
1 8t0 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T + 1g:
By Assumption 4.2, player 2's strategy satises lims!1 2(z(h^`s1 ))(0) = 1.
We x natural numbers T and s 2 N that satisfy
u1(0; 0)  u1(1; 0) >T+1 fu1(0; k2)  u1(k1; 0)g ;
1(!
; h^`s1  ht
0
1 )(0) > 0; 8ht
0
1 2 Ht
0
1 8t0 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T + 1g; and
2(z(h^
`s
1  ht
0
1 ))(0) = 1; 8ht
0
1 2 Ht
0
1 8t0 2 f0; 1; : : : ; T + 1g:
Let us denote by v1(a1; h
t
1) the continuation payo when the normal type chooses
one shot deviation from 1 to action a1 at a private history h
t
1. Continuation payos
v1(a1; h^
`s
1 ) and v1(0; h^
`s
1 ) satisfy that
v1(a1; h^
`s
1 ) <(1  )u1(a1; 0) + (1  T )u1(0; 0) + T+1(1  )u1(0; k2); 8a1 2 A1nf0g;
v1(0; h^
`s
1 ) (1  )u1(0; 0) + (1  T )u1(0; 0) + T+1(1  )u1(k1; 0):
Thereby, for all a1 2 A1nf0g, it holds that
v1(a1; h^
`s
1 )  v1(0; h^`s1 )
1   <  (u1(0; 0)  u1(1; 0)) + 
T+1 fu1(0; k2)  u1(k1; 0)g < 0:
It is proved that there exists a natural number s such that the normal type's unique
best response is action 0 when 2 < 1. Therefore, it has been proved that there exists
a natural number s, such that the normal type's unique best response is action 0 at
private history h^`s1 when 2 = 1. Hence,  is not an equilibrium. It is a contradiction.
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Let us dene 1 as the strategy of player 1 in which the
normal type chooses k1 at any history. Let us dene 2 as the pure strategy of player 2
in which, at any ht2, player 2 chooses the largest action among the best responses given
1 and 2. In what follows, we prove that the strategy prole (1; 2) is a sequential
equilibrium.
For any public history ht2 = (y
s)t 1maxf0;t mg, we dene Pr(h
t
2) as follows:
Pr(ht2) =
t 1Y
s=maxf0;t mg
pk1(y
s):
The probability Pr(ht2) is equal to the probability that public history h
t
2 is realized
when player 1 chooses action k1 in each period from period maxf0; t  mg to period
t  1.
For any t and the sequence of public signal (ys)t 1s=0, let us dene ~z((y
s)t 1s=0) as the
public history induced by (ys)t 1s=0. That is, ~z((y
s)t 1s=0) = (y
s)t 1s=maxf0;t mg. For any h
t
2
and ~ht
0
2 , let us dene h
t
2  ~ht02  ~z(ht2  ~ht02 ). That is, ht2  ~ht02 is the sequence of public
signals from m-period ago given a concatenation of ht2 followed by
~ht
0
2 .
The distribution function on A1 given belief at (h
t
2ys)ht02 has rst-order stochas-
tic dominance over that given belief at (ht2  ys 1)  ht02 . Hence, by Assumption 4.2,
for any s, it holds that
u1(a1; 2((h
t
2  ys) ht
0
2 ))  u1(a1; 2((ht2  ys 1) ht
0
2 )):
Let us denote by v1(a1; h
t
2) the continuation payo when the normal type chooses a
one-shot deviation from 1 to action a1 at public history h
t
2. The continuation payo
68
v1(a1; h
t
2) is given by
v1(a1; h
t
2) =(1  )u1(a1; 2(ht2))
+ (1  )
1X
t0=0
t
0+1
X
y2Y
pa1(y)
X
ht
0
2 2Ht
0
2
Pr(ht
0
2 )u1(k1; 2((h
t
2  y) ht
0
2 ))
=(1  )u1(a1; 2(ht2))
+ (1  )
1X
t0=0
t
0+1
X
ht
0
2 2Ht
0
2
Pr(ht
0
2 )

u1(k1; 2((h
t
2  yk) ht
0
2 ))
+
kX
s=1
fu1(k1; 2((ht2  ys) ht
0
2 ))  u1(k1; 2((ht2  ys 1) ht
0
2 ))gf Fk1(ys 1)g

:
Thus, we have
v1(k1; h
t
2)  v1(a1; ht2) =  (1  )fu1(a1; 2(ht2))  u1(k1; 2(ht2))g
+ (1  )
1X
t0=0
t
0+1
X
ht
0
2 2Ht
0
2
Pr(ht
0
2 )
 kX
s=1
fu1(k1; 2((ht2  ys) ht
0
2 ))
  u1(k1; 2((ht2  ys 1) ht
0
2 ))gfFa1(ys 1)  Fk1(ys 1)g

:
(4.10)
By rst-order stochastic dominance, for any ht2; h
t0
2 , it holds that
kX
s=1

fu1(k1; 2((ht2  ys) ht
0
2 ))  u1(k1; 2((ht2  ys 1) ht
0
2 ))gfFa1(ys 1)  Fk1(ys 1)g

 0:
The dierence in the expected stage-game payo (1 )fu1(a1; 2(ht2)) u1(k1; 2(ht2))g
is positive. To ensure that the right-hand side of (4.10) is positive, we will show that
there exist ht2; h
t0
2 for which the last term of (4.10) is positive.
For any s 2 f0; 1; : : : ;m  1g, let us dene gs as
gs = (
m s 1z }| {
y0; y0; : : : ; y0;
sz }| {
yk; yk; : : : ; yk):
By (4.1) and (4.2), there exists a (;  )(2 f0; 1; : : : ; kg  f0; 1; : : : ;m  1g) such that
2(y  g ) > 2(y 1  g ) = 0:
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For any gi and h
t
2, it holds that (h
t
2  y) gi = y  gi and
u1(k1; 2((h
t
2  y) g ))  u1(k1; 2((ht2  y 1) g )) > u1(k1; 1)  u1(k1; 0):
Therefore, we obtain
v1(k1; h
t
2)  v1(a1; ht2)
  (1  ) max
a22A2
fu1(0; a2)  u1(k1; a2)g
+ (1  )m+1 Pr(g ) fu1(k1; 1)  u1(k1; 0)g fFa1(y 1)  Fk1(y 1)g
   (1  ) max
a22A2
fu1(0; a2)  u1(k1; a2)g+ (1  )m+1

min
y2Y
pk1(y)
m 1
fu1(k1; 1)  u1(k1; 0)g


min
a12A1nfk1g
min
y2Y nfykg
fFi(y)  Fk1(y)g

> 0:
It is proved that 1 is an optimal strategy for player 1. The strategy of player 2 is an
optimal strategy of player 2 by the denition. Hence, it is proved that (1; 2) is a
sequential equilibrium.
Finally, we show that strategy prole (1; 2) satises Assumption 4.5. Player 1's
strategy satises Assumption 4.5 because the normal type chooses action k1 at any
history. Let us dene a nite set B as the set of beliefs that are realized on the
equilibrium path:
B fx 2 [0; 1]jx = t2(!jht2) for some t and ht2g
=fx 2 [0; 1]jx = t2(!jht2) for some t 2 f0; 1 : : : ;mg and ht2 2 Ht2g
We select  such that for any x; x0 2 B
jjx  x0jj <  ) x = x0:
By the denition of 2, player 2 chooses the same (mixed) actions if player 2 has the
same beliefs. Hence, it is proved that player 2's strategy satises Assumption 4.5. The
strategy prole (1; 2) is an equilibrium.
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Chapter 5
An Eciency in Repeated
Prisoners' Dilemma with
Observation Costs
5.1 Introduction
It is well known that if each player in an innitely repeated game can observe the
action of the other players, then they can achieve a Pareto ecient equilibrium payo
vector (the eciency theorem). The eciency theorem is the following statement:
a Pareto ecient payo vector is achieved by an equilibrium when players are pa-
tient. However, it is not obvious whether an eciency theorem holds under private
monitoring structures.
The monitoring structure is said to be costly observation if a player obtains ad-
ditional information when he incurs a cost. We focus on a costly observation as a
monitoring structure, and we show an eciency result in an innitely repeated pris-
oner's dilemma under costly observation.
A few papers present the folk theorem in some types of games under costly ob-
servation. The folk theorem is the following statement: Any feasible and individual
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rational payo vector is achieved by an equilibrium if players are patient. Hence, if the
folk theorem holds, then eciency theorem holds. Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003)
show a folk theorem when communication is available. Miyagawa et al. (2003) show
an approximate folk theorem when each player can choose at least three actions and
the monitoring cost is small.
Our main contribution is to show an eciency result in an innitely repeated
prisoner's dilemma, which the above results do not cover. The basic idea of the
current chapter is public randomization (sunspot) and restart as shown in Bhaskar
and van Damme (2002). In each period, a sunspot is realized at the end of the period.
We consider the following strategy: for any period, when a specic sunspot is realized
at the end of the period, the continuation strategy from the next period is equal to
the strategy from initial period. Under such strategies, the continuation plays are
determined independently of the realized signals if a specic sunspot is realized at the
end of the period. Thus, each player views the current stage-game payo as more
important than when there exists no restart. Hence, it is well known that, under such
strategies, players play a game as if they have lower discount factors than their own
discount factors.
In particular, we conne our attention to a sequential equilibrium in which each
player follows an automaton strategy. We say that a player follows an automaton
strategy if he chooses an action and a monitoring decision depending on his private
states. The key idea of the current chapter is that we change the restart probability
depending on states. In previous studies, the restart probability is assumed to be the
same for any history. However, we assume that the restart probability in the initial
state is smaller than in the other states. This new idea helps players to coordinate with
the other players, and we show that an eciency result holds when the observation
costs are suciently small in repeated games with less complex strategy than previous
papers.
Many papers investigate whether a folk theorem or eciency theorem holds or
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not in innitely repeated games under various monitoring structures. The monitoring
structure is said to be perfect if each player observes the realized action prole. Moni-
toring structure is said to be imperfect public if players cannot observe realized action
prole, but they can observe the same noisy signals. The monitoring structure is said
to be (imperfect) private if each player cannot observe the realized action prole, but
he can observe a signal, which is realized stochastically and his private information.
A folk theorem is proved under perfect monitoring by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986),
and is proved under imperfect public monitoring by Fudenberg et al. (1994). That is,
they show that any feasible and strictly individual rational payo vectors can achieve
by an equilibrium under each monitoring structure.
There are various studies on private monitoring because there is a variety of private
monitoring (e.g., conditional independent private signals, correlated private signals,
and so on). Many papers try to prove a folk theorem or an eciency result under each
private monitoring structure. Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996), Kandori and Mat-
sushima (1998), Compte (1998) and Obara (2009) show folk theorems under private
monitoring with communication. A private monitoring structure is said to be almost
perfect if signals are suciently informative. Ely and Valimaki (2002) and Horner
and Olszewski (2006) show folk theorems without communication under almost per-
fect monitoring. Sugaya and Wolitzky (2014) show a folk theorem when a mediator is
available.
Our model with costly observation belongs to a class of games with private monitor-
ing. However, it is signicantly dierent from the above studies on private monitoring.
In costly observation, each player's monitoring decision is assumed to be unobservable.
This structure makes it dicult to enforce each player to monitor the other player. If
any player does not monitor the other player, each player strictly prefers the dominant-
action of the stage-game. Thus, it is dicult to achieve a Pareto ecient equilibrium
payo vector under costly observation.
Some papers challenge to analyze innitely repeated games under costly observa-
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tion. Lehrer (1989, 1992a, 1992b) provides the seminal works about costly observation.
He considers the following two actions. One action is dominated by the other action
in the stage-game. These two actions produce the same probability distribution over
the set of other player's signals. That is, the other player cannot distinguish between
these two actions. He shows that, in an equilibrium, a player can choose the dominated
action of the stage-game if he obtains precise information from the action. This can
be interpreted as a player choosing costly monitoring in an equilibrium.
Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) and Miyagawa et al. (2003) consider a costly
observation model in which (i) if a player pays a cost, then he observes the action
chosen by other players, and (ii) if a player does not pay a cost, then he observes
nothing. Miyagawa et al. (2003) show a sucient condition for an eciency result
with public randomization when the monitoring cost is suciently small and each
player is patient. Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) introduce communication and
show a sucient condition for a folk theorem. Miyagawa et al. (2008) relaxed the
assumption in ours and the above two studies that each player observes nothing if he
does not incur a cost. Miyagawa et al. (2008) assume that each player can observe
private signals even if he does not incur a cost. They show a folk theorem in repeated
games without communication for any level of observation costs.
Our monitoring structure is the same as those analyzed in the above three studies
in the sense that if a player pays a cost, then he can observe the realized action prole
in the current period. We show an eciency result with less complex strategy (three-
state automata) than those in the studies (e.g., six-state automata in a prisoner's
dilemma in Miyagawa et al. (2008)).
Kandori and Obara (2004) assume that each player can observe not only the other
player's action but also the other player's monitoring decision, if he incurs a cost. They
allow monitoring error about \monitoring decisions". That is, when players monitor
the other players, each player might observe a dierent signal from the monitoring
decision chosen by the other player. They show an eciency result when a monitoring
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error occurs with a small probability.
The following two studies relaxed the assumption in the above studies that if a
player pays a cost, then he can observe the realized action prole in the \current"
period. Flesch and Perea (2009) assume that each player can observe \actions in the
past" if they incur costs. They show that if players can choose at least four actions,
then a folk theorem holds even when neither public randomization nor communication
is available. Our model discussed in this chapter does not satisfy this condition.
Awaya (2014) checks the robustness of Takahashi (2010). Takahashi (2010) shows
a folk theorem in repeated games with randomly matched players. Awaya (2014)
assumes the following costly observation: each player can observe \the sequence of
actions that the opposing player chose in the past" if he monitors the other player.
He consider the monitoring cost is innitesimal. That is, the monitoring decision
does not aect each player's payo, but he prefers a strategy in which the number
of monitoring is small among strategies under which he obtains the same expected
stage-game payo (lexicographic preference). Awaya (2014) proves a folk theorem in
models of Takahashi (2010) under innitesimal monitoring cost when communication
is available. He also shows that the strategy he uses to prove the folk theorem is not
a sequential equilibrium if the observation cost is strictly positive. In addition, if the
observation cost is greater than the maximum dierence of stage-game payos, then
any equilibrium is a repetition of stage-game Nash equilibrium action prole.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Sec-
tion 5.2. In Section 5.3, we show an eciency result.
5.2 Model
In this section, we dene an innitely repeated game with costly observation. That is,
monitoring of each player is voluntary and it incurs a cost. First, we dene a prisoner's
dilemma as a stage-game and explain monitoring structure. Next, we consider the
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innitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.
We consider a prisoner's dilemma as a stage-game. Let Ai  fC i; Dig be the set
of actions available for player i. Let A  A1  A2 denote the set of action proles.
Given an action prole a 2 A, the stage-game payo for player i, ui(a), is given by
the following payo matrix.
Prisoner's dilemma
Player 2
C2 D2
Payer 1
C1 1; 1  `; 1 + g
D1 1 + g; ` 0; 0
Assumption 5.1 (i) g > 0 and ` > 0, (ii) g   ` < 1 and (iii) g   ` > 0.
The rst condition implies that Ci is dominated by Di, and the second condition
ensures that the payo vector of action prole (C1; C2) is Pareto-ecient. The last
condition is crucial for our result.
Each player decides which action to choose and whether to monitor the opponent or
not, at the same time. If player i chooses to monitor, he incurs monitoring cost  > 0
and he observes the action chosen by the other player. If player i does not monitor,
he does not incur any additional cost. Let Bi  fM i; N ig be the set of monitoring
decision of player i. Monitoring decision M i means that player i chooses to monitor.
Monitoring decision N i means that player i chooses not to monitor. Hence, given
an action prole a 2 A and monitoring decision bi 2 Bi, the stage-game payo for
player i, ~ui(a; bi), is given by
~ui(a; bi) 
8><>:ui(a)  ; if bi =M i;ui(a); if bi = N i:
LetOi  Aj[f'ig be the set of observations for player i. Observing aj 2 Aj means that
player i chooses monitoring decision M i and observes that player j chooses action aj.
If player i chooses monitoring decision N i, then he observes 'i, that is, he observes
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nothing. We assume that monitoring decision of player i is not observable to player j.
Each player cannot observe the monitoring decision of the opponent player even when
he pays an observation cost.
Players play the above prisoner's dilemma repeatedly over periods t = 1; 2; : : : We
assume that there exists a public randomization device (\sunspot"). In each period,
a sunspot is realized after the choice of actions. The sunspot is uniformly distributed
over [0; 1] independently of the sequence of action proles and sunspots realized in the
past. Each player observes the realized sunspot without any cost.
The sequence of events in each period is summarized as follows. First, each player i
simultaneously chooses an action ai 2 Ai and decides whether to monitor the action
chosen by the opponent player or not. Finally, a sunspot is realized.
Player i's history at the beginning of period t  2 is a sequence of his own actions,
his observations about the other player's actions and realized sunspots up to period t 
1. Formally, it is a sequence
hti = (a
s
i ; b
s
i ; x
s)t 1s=1 2 (Ai Oi  [0; 1])t 1:
For t  1, let Hti denote the set of all player i's histories at the beginning of
period t. Let H1i be an arbitrary singleton set. For any set K, let (K) be the set
of probability distributions over K. A strategy of player i is a function of his private
history to distributions over Ai Bi, i : [1s=1Hti ! (Ai Bi).
A strategy prole  = (1; 2) generates a probability distribution over the set
of outcomes, (A  Bi)1. Given an outcome (as; bsi )1s=1, player i's discounted average
payo is
(1  )
1X
s=1
s~ui(a
s; bsi );
where  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor common between player 1 and player 2. Players
maximize the expected discounted average payos. We use sequential equilibrium as
a solution concept.
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We assume that each player observes nothing if he does not incur a cost. This
implies that each player does not receive the stage game payos until the innitely
repeated game \ends", and he receives them after the innitely repeated game ends.
In the basic interpretation of innitely repeated games, the innitely repeated game
is assumed to be continued permanently. However, if we consider the discount factor
as a probability that the innitely repeated game continues, then the interpretation
that each player receives his payo after the innitely repeated game ends is less
problematic. This assumption is extreme, and it eliminates all the issues about the
monitoring structure besides costly observation from our model.
5.3 An eciency
In this section, we show an eciency result when public randomization is available.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose that Assumption 5.1 is satised. For any " > 0, there exists
 2 (0; 1) and  > 0 such that for any  2 [; 1) and any  2 (0; ], there exists a
sequential equilibrium whose payo vector (v1; v

2) satises that jvi  1j < " for i = 1; 2.
Proposition 5.1 holds even when we focus on automata strategies as equilibrium
strategies.
Denition 5.1 An automaton (Si; s

i ; f i; T i) consists of the set of state Si, an initial
state si 2 Si, an output function f i : Si ! (AiBi), and a transition function T i :
Si  Ai  Bi ! Si. An automata is said to be automation sequential equilibrium if
the automaton induces a sequential equilibrium strategy.
In fact, we show Proposition 5.1 by constructing automation sequential equilibrium.
Proof. First, we dene automata and a belief system. Next, we show that the belief
system is consistent with the strategy induced by the automata. Finally, we show that
the pair of the strategy and the belief system is a sequential equilibrium and prove
Proposition 5.3
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Let us consider the following automaton with states si , s
C
i and s
D
i .
The output function fi and the transition function T i at state s

i is dened as
follows. Player i chooses (Ci;M i) with probability (1 )(1 ), and chooses (C i; N i)
with probability (1   ), and chooses (Di; N i) with the remaining probability .
When sunspot satises that x > x, the state remains the same. The state moves to sCi
if sunspot satises that x  x and player i played Ci and observed Cj. Otherwise, the
state moves to state sDi . The output function from state s

i is summarized as follows.
fi(s

i ) =(1  )(1  )[(C i;M i)] + (1  )[(Ci; N i)] + [(Di; N i)]:
Transition function from state si is summarized as follows.
T i(s

i ; ai; oi; x) =
8>>>><>>>>:
sCi ; if x  x and (ai; oi) = (Ci; Cj);
sDi ; if x  x and (ai; oi) 6= (C i; Cj);
si ; if x > x;
where (ai; oi) 2 Ai Oi.
The output function fi and the transition function T i at state s
C
i is dened as
follows. Player i chooses (Ci;M i) with probability 1   , and chooses (C i; N i) with
the remaining probability . When sunspot satises that x > x^, the state moves to
state si . The state moves to s
C
i if sunspot satises that x  x^ and player i played Ci
and observed Cj. Otherwise, the state moves to state s
D
i . The output function from
state sCi is summarized as follows.
fi(s
C
i ) =(1  )[(Ci;M i)] + [(Ci; N i)]:
Transition function from state sCi is summarized as follows.
T i(s
C
i ; ai; oi; x) =
8>>>><>>>>:
sCi ; if x  x^ and (ai; oi) = (C i; Cj);
sDi ; if x  x^ and (ai; oi) 6= (C i; Cj);
si ; if x > x^;
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where (ai; oi) 2 Ai Oi.
The output function fi and the transition function T i at state s
D
i is dened as
follows. Player i chooses action (Di; N i) with probability 1. The state moves to s
C
i if
sunspot satises that x  x^ and player i played Ci and observed Cj (Note that this
event is o the path). Otherwise, the state remains the same. The output function
from state sDi is summarized as follows.
fi(s
D
i ) =1  [(Di; N i)]:
Transition function from state sDi is summarized as follows.
T i(s
D
i ; ai; oi; x) =
8>>>><>>>>:
sCi ; if x  x^ and (ai; oi) = (C i; Cj);
sDi ; if x  x^ and (ai; oi) 6= (C i; Cj);
si ; if x > x^;
where (ai; oi) 2 Ai Oi.
In what follows, we assume that  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1) hold and we dene a
belief system. Let  ti(h
t
i) be the belief of player i at the beginning of period t over Htj
given hti. We call  i  ( ti)1t=1 player i's belief and  = ( 1;  2) a belief system.
We dene a belief system  ^ = ( ^1;  ^2) which is consistent with the strategy. Belief
system  ^ is generated by the following trembling of the output functions.
fi (s

i ) =(1  ) f(1  )(1  )[(C i;M i)] + (1  )[(Ci; N i)] + [(Di; N i)]g+ [(Di;M i)]:
fi (s
C
i ) =(1  2) f(1  )[(Ci;M i)] + [(Ci; N i)]g+ [(Di; N i)] + [(Di;M i)]:
fi (s
D
i ) = f(1  )[(C i;M i)] + [(Ci; N i)]g+ (1  2)[(Di; N i)] + [(Di;M i)]
The output function fi converges to fi as  goes to zero. Four-tuple (f

1 ; f

2 ; T 1; T 2)
generates a belief system  1; for any  > 0. We dene player i's belief: ^i  lim#0  1;.
Each player i's strategy is generated by the automaton f i which depends only on
player i's state. Hence, it is sucient to consider beliefs over the set of the other
player's states instead of beliefs over the set of the other player's histories in order
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to examine player i's sequential rationality. By the construction of  ^t, we nd the
following facts about beliefs over the set of states.
First, we consider the set of histories at period t in which player i's state at period t
is state si . We can divide the set into the following three sets: (1) initial history; (2)
the set of histories in which the state of player i at period t   1 is si and x > x is
realized in period t  1; (3) the set of histories in which player i's state at period t  1
is either sCi or s
D
i and x
t is greater than x^.
For any sequence of realized sunspots, player i's state is si if and only if player j's
state is sj by the construction of transition functions. Thus, for any period t, both on
and o the path, player i believes that player j's state at period t is sj with probability
one.
Second, we consider state sCi . We divide the set of histories at period t in which
player i's state at period t is sCi into three sets: (1) the set of histories in which
player i's state at period t   1 was si , player i chose action Ci and observed Cj in
period t 1 and xt was not greater than x ; (2) the set of histories in which the state of
player i at period t  1 is sCi , player i observed (Ci; Cj) in period t  1 and x  x^ was
realized in period t  1 ; (3) the set of histories in which player i's state at period t  1
was sDi , player i chose action Ci and observed Cj in period t 1 and xt was not greater
than x^ (o the path).
At both state sj and state s
C
j , player j chooses action Cj with a positive probabil-
ity, and player j observes player i's action with probability 1   given action Cj. In
addition, by the construction of tremble, player i believes that when player j chooses
action Cj at state s
D
j (o the path), player j observes player i's action with probabil-
ity 1  .
Consider a history is in the set of (1). Then, player i in period t  1 believed that
player j's state at period t  1 is sj with probability one. Hence, player i in period t
believes that player j's state at period t is sCj with probability 1    and sDj with
probability  because player i believes that player j in period t  1 observed player i's
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action C i with probability 1  .
Next, suppose that the state of player i in period t   1 is either sCi or sDi . Then,
player i in period t   1 believed that player j's state at period t   1 is sCi or sDi
with probability one. Player i believes that player j's state in period t is sCj with
probability 1    and sDj with probability  because given observation Cj, player i
believes that player j in period t 1 observed player i's action Ci with probability 1 
at each state.
Finally, we consider the set of histories in which player i's state at period t is sDi .
The set can be divided into the following sets. The rst set is the set of histories in
which player i's state is si in period period t   1, either player i chooses action Di
in period t   1 or player i observes action Dj in period t   1 and x  x is realized
in period t   1. The second set is the set of histories in which the state of player i
at period t  1 is either sCi or sDi , either player i chooses action Di in period t  1 or
player i observes action Dj in period t   1 and xt 1 is not greater than x^ . Let us
denote by ti (< t) the latest period at which player i's state is s

i . Then, the third set
is the set of histories in which player i chooses Ci, player i does not observe player j's
action in period ~t = ti ; t

i + 1; : : : ; t  1, sunspot xt

i is not greater than x and x~t  x^
holds for ~t = ti +1; t

i +2; : : : ; t 1. Let us denote by tCi (< t) the latest period at which
player i's state is sCi . The nal set is the set of histories in which player i chooses C i,
player i does not observe player j's action in period ~t = tCi ; t
C
i +1; : : : ; t  1 and x  x^
is realized in period ~t = tCi ; t
C
i + 1; : : : ; t  1.
For any history in the set of (1){(2), player i believes that player j's state is sDj
with probability one. We consider histories in the set of (3). Suppose that ti = t  1
holds. Then, player i in period t   1 believed that player j's state in period t   1
was sj . Therefore, player i in period t believes that player j's state at period t is s
C
j
with probability (1   )(1   ) and sDj with probability 1   (1   )(1   ) because
player i chose C i and player i did not observe player j's action in period t  1. Next,
suppose that t   ti > 1. Then, in the same way as the case for ti = t   1, player i
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in period ti believed that player j's state at period t

i was s

j . Thus, player j's state
in period t is sCj if and only if player j chose Cj and player j observed player i's
action in period ~t = ti ; t

i + 1; : : : ; t   1. Hence, player i in period t believes that
player j's state at period t is sCj with probability (1   )(1   )t t

i and sDj with
probability 1  (1  )(1  )t ti .
We can consider histories in the set of (4) in the same way as histories in the set
of (3). First, suppose that tCi = t   1 holds. Then, player i's state at period t   1
was sCi and player i in period t   1 believed that player j's state at period t   1 was
sCj with probability 1    and sDj with probability . On the path, player j moves
to state sCj in period t if and only if player j observed player i's action at state s
C
i in
period t  1. Thus, player i in period t believes that player j's state at period t is sCj
with probability (1   )2 and sDj with probability 1   (1   )2. Next, suppose that
t tCi > 1. Then, in the same way as the case for tCi = t 1, player i's state in period tCi
was sCi and player i in period t
C
i believed that player j's state at period t 1 was sCj with
probability 1  and sDj with probability . Player j moves to state sCj in period t if and
only if player j observed player i's action at state sCi in period ~t = t
C
i ; t
C
i +1; : : : ; t 1.
This event happens with probability (1  )t tCi when player j's state at period tCi is
sCj . Therefore, player i in period t believes that player j's state in period t is s
C
j with
probability (1  )t tCi +1 and sDj with probability 1  (1  )t tCi +1.
Next, we show that it is optimal for each player to follow the automata given the
belief system. Let V Ci be the continuation payo when player i believes that the state
of player j is sCj with probability 1  , sDj with probability . Let us denote by V Di
the continuation payo when player i believes that the state of player j is sDj . Let V

i
be the payo given this automata. If the automata is a sequential equilibrium, then,
the continuation payo V Ci and V
D
i are given by
V Ci =(1  )[(1  )  `  ] + x^(1  )V Ci + x^V Di + (1  x^)V i ; (5.1)
V Di =x^V
D
i + (1  x^)V i : (5.2)
First, we consider player i's best response at state si . If player i chooses C i and
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observes Cj and sunspot satises x
1  x in period 1, then player i in period 2 believes
that the state of player j is sCj with probability 1   , sDj with probability . That
is, the continuation payo from period 2 is V Ci . If player i chooses Di and sunspot
satises x1  x in period 1, then player i believes that the state of player j is sDj with
probability one. That is, the continuation payo from period 2 is V Di .
In addition, (Di;M i) is never a best response at any history because the con-
tinuation strategy when he chooses action Di and observes Cj and the continuation
strategy when he chooses action Di and observes Dj lead to the same result. Hence,
it is optimal for player i in period 1 to follow the automaton strategy if the following
is held.
(1  )[(1  )  `  ] + x(1  )V Ci + xV Di + (1  x)V i
=(1  )[(1  )  `] + x(1  )(1  )(1 + g) (5.3)
+ 2xx^V Di + (1  x)V i + 2x(1  x^)V i
=(1  )(1  )(1 + g) + xV Di + (1  x)V i (5.4)
Next, we consider player i's best response at state sCi . If player i's state is s
C
i ,
then player i believes that player j's state is sCj with probability 1   , and sDj with
probability . Considering that (Di;M i) is never a best response for any history, we
nd that it is optimal for player i to follow the automaton strategy at state sCi , if the
following is held.
(1  )[(1  )  `  ] + x^(1  )V Ci + x^V Di + (1  x^)V i
=(1  )[(1  )  `] + x^(1  )2(1 + g) (5.5)
+ 2x^2V Di + (1  x^)V i + 2x^(1  x^)V i
(1  )[(1  )(1 + g)] + x^V Di + (1  x^)V i : (5.6)
We rewrite the inequalities (5.3){(5.6). Substituting (5.1) and (5.2) into righthand
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side of (5.5) repeatedly, we obtain
(1  )[(1  )  `  ] + x^(1  )V Ci + x^V Di + (1  x^)V i
=(1 + x^)(1  )[(1  )  `  ] + (x^)2(1  )V Ci + (x^)2V Di + (1 + x^)(1  x^)V i
=
[(1  )  `  ]
1  x^(1  ) +
(1  x^)
1  x^ V

i
In the same way, inequalities (5.5){(5.6) can be rewritten as follows.
(1  )[(1  )  `  ]
1  x^(1  ) +
(1  x^)
1  x^ V

i
=(1  )[(1  )  `] + (1  )x^(1  )2(1 + g) + (1  x^)
1  x^ V

i
(1  )(1  )(1 + g) + (1  x^)
1  x^ V

i
Let us dene a discount factor ^ and a continuation payo w as follows.
^ x^
w (1  ^)[(1  )  `  ] + ^(1  )w = (1  ^)[(1  )  `  ]
1  ^(1  )
Then, inequalities (5.5){ (5.6) are equivalent to the following.
w = (1  ^)[(1  )  `] + (1  ^)^(1  )2(1 + g)  (1  ^)(1  )(1 + g):
In the same way, equalities (5.3){ (5.4) can be rewritten as follows.
V i =(1  )[(1  )  `  ] + x(1  )w +

(1  x) + x(1  x^)
1  x^

V i (5.7)
=(1  )[(1  )  `] + (1  )x(1  )(1 + g) +

(1  x) + x(1  x^)
1  x^

V i
=(1  )(1  )(1 + g) +

(1  x) + x(1  x^)
1  x^

V i :
Let us dene a discount factor   x. Then, equations (5.3){ (5.4) are equivalent to
the following.
(1  ^)[  (1  )`  ] + w = (1  ^)[  (1  )`] + (1 + g) = (1  ^)(1 + g)
Therefore, we have the following fact.
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Fact 5.1 Fix a discount factor  2 (0; 1) and monitoring cost  > 0. Fix a 5-
tuple (; ; ; ^; w). From equality (5.7), the payo V i is given by
V i =
1
1   + ^
h
(1  ^)[(1  )  `  ] + (1  )w
i
:
It is optimal for player i to follow the automaton strategy at state si if and only if it
holds that
(1  ^)[(1  )  `  ] + (1  )w (5.8)
=(1  ^)[(1  )  `] + (1  ^)(1  )(1  )(1 + g) (5.9)
=(1  ^)(1  )(1 + g): (5.10)
It is optimal for player i to follow the automaton strategy at state sCi if and only if it
holds that
w =(1  ^)[(1  )  `  ] + ^(1  )w (5.11)
=(1  ^)[(1  )  `] + (1  ^)^(1  )2(1 + g) (5.12)
(1  ^)(1  )(1 + g): (5.13)
Fix " > 0. In what follows, we show that if we x any suciently small ~"(< "), then
there exists  2 (0; 1) and  > 0 such that for any  2 [; 1) and any  2 (0; ], there
exists a sequential equilibrium whose payo vector (v1; v

2) satises that jvi   1j < ~"
for i = 1; 2. This statement is one of the sucient conditions that Proposition 5.1
holds.
Fix any suciently small ~"(< "). We dene  and :
 g + 2~"
1 + g
;
  `(g   `)
18(1 + g)3
~":
Fix any  2 [; 1) and  2 (0; ). First, we x w = 1   ~". We dene (; ; ; ^) as a
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solution of simultaneous equations (5.9){(5.12). We have the followings.
 =
(1  ^)(~"  )
(1  ^)(1 + `) + ^(1  ~") ;
 =
g   ^(1  )2(1 + g)
g   ` ;
 =
1  
1  ^: (5.14)
All we have to do is to show the followings. (1) The strategy is well-dened. That is,
0 < ; ; x; x^ < 1 holds, and (2) player i's best response at state sCi is (Ci;M i) and
(Ci; N i), that is, inequality (5.13) holds, and (3) player i's unique best response at
state sDi is (Di; N i), (4) the equilibrium payo V

i is greater than 1  ~".
To show that the strategy is well-dened, we prove  2 (0; 1),  2 (0; 1), ^ 2 (0; 1)
and  2 (0; 1). First, we prove  2 (0; 1). We obtain  > 0 if ^ 2 (0; 1) holds because
 <  < ~" hold and ~" is small. We also derive  < ~" for small ~" if ^ 2 (0; 1) holds as
follows.
~"   = ~"f(1  ^)`+ ^(1  ~")g+ (1  ^)
(1  ^)(1 + `) + ^(1  ~") > 0:
Hence, we obtain  2 (0; ~")  (0; 1) because ~" is sucently small.
Second, we show  2 (0; 1). From equality (5.12), we have
(1  ^)(1  )(1 + g) = w   1  ^
^(1  ): (5.15)
Using equality (5.12), we have
(1  ^)(1  )(1 + g)
=(1  ^)(1  )(1 + g) + (1  ^)(   )(1 + g)
=w   1  ^
^(1  )+ (1  ^)(   )(1 + g):
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Using equality (5.12), we have
(1  ^)[(1  )  `] + (1  ^)(1  )(1  )(1 + g)
=(1  ^)[(1  )  `] + (1  ^)^(1  )2(1 + g) + (1  ^)(   )(1 + `)
=w + (1  ^)(   )(1 + `):
From the above two equalities, we have.
    = 
^(1 + `)(g   `) > 0: (5.16)
Assumption 5.1{(iii) ensures strictly inequality. We obtain (<  < ~") < 1.
To prove that  is positive, we show the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1 Suppose that Assumption 5.1 is satised. Then, the followings hold.
^ 2

g
1 + g
;
g + 2~"
1 + g

; and (5.17)
 >
~"  
2(1 + g)
: (5.18)
Proof. By equality (5.12), we have
1  ^
^
  (1  )f1  ~"  (1  ^)(1 + g)g = 0: (5.19)
The lefthand side of (5.19) is positive if ^ = g
1+g
. If ^ = g+2~"
1+g
, then the lefthand side of
(5.19) is negative because ( ) < ~" and  < ~" and ~" is suciently small. Therefore,
there exists ^ 2

g
1+g
; g+2~"
1+g

that satises equality (5.12).
Then, it holds that
 =
(1  ^)(~"  )
(1  ^)(1 + `) + ^(1  ~")
>
~"  
(1 + `) + g(1  ~")
>
~"  
2(1 + g)
:
88
From equation (5.16) and the above lemma, we have
 =   
^(1  )(g   `)
>   
^(g   `)
>
~"  
2(1 + g)
  1 + g
g(g   `) (5.20)
>0:
The last inequality follows from   . Thus, we have  2 (0; )  (0; 1).
Third, we show x^ 2 [0; 1]. By the above lemma, we have ^ 2

g
1+g
; g+2~"
1+g

. That is,
0 < ^(< ) < . It means that x^ 2 (0; 1).
Finally, we show x 2 [0; 1]. By inequality (5.16) and 0 <  <  < 1, we have
0 <  < ^ < . It implies that that x^ 2 (0; 1).
Equality (5.15) implies that strict inequality holds in inequality (5.13). That is, it
is proved that it is optimal for each player to follow the automata at state sCi .
Next, we prove that it is optimal for each player to follow the automata at state sDi .
To prove it, we consider the following situation to show that (Di; N i) is a best response
when the automaton prescribes to move to state sDi . Suppose that a private history h
2
i
at which (a1i ; o
1
i ) = (C i; N i) were realized in period 1. Assume that player i can observe
player j costless in period t  2.
In such a situation, player i's optimal strategy from period 2 is the grim trigger
strategy in which he chooses (Ci;M i) if (Ci; Cj) is realized in period 1; 2; : : : , he
chooses (Di;M i) otherwise. The continuation payo from period 2 is given by
w^ = w +
1  ^
1  ^(1  ):
The above payo is greater than the payo when he chooses (Ci; N i). Consider a
private history at which the automata prescribes to move to state sDi . Given such
private history, player i has the following belief over Sj. The state of player j is s

j
with probability zero, it is sCj with probability p( (1   )(1   )) and it is sDj with
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probability 1  p. Hence, if he chooses (C i; N i), then he has
(1  ^)[p  (1  p)`] + (1  ^)^p(1  )(1 + g)
<(1  ^)[(1  )  `] + (1  ^)^(1  )2(1 + g) = w < w^:
Thus, (C i;M i) is more protable for player i than (C i; N i). Therefore, we compare the
payo when player i chooses (Di; N i) with the payo when player i chooses (C i;M i).
Choosing (Di; N i) is more protable than choosing (Ci;M i) for player i when the
following is positive.
(1  ^)p(1 + g) 
h
(1  ^) fp  `(1  p)g+ ^pw^
i
(5.21)
The above is a decreasing function of p because the following holds.
^w^   (1  ^)(g   `) > 1
1 + g
fg(1  ~")  (g   `)g > 1
1 + g
(`  ~") > 0:
We show that (5.21) is positive when p = (1  )(1  ).
(1  ^)(1  )(1  )(1 + g)
 
h
(1  ^) f(1  )(1  )  `(+    )g+ ^(1  )(1  )w^
i
=[(1  ^)(1  )(`+ ~")  w]  1  ^
^(1  ) 
n
1  ^(1  )
o 1  ^
1  ^(1  )
(by inequality (5.20))
>

~"  
2(1 + g)
  1 + g
g(g   `)

[(1  ^)(1  )`  ]  2(1  ^)
^
  
(by ^ 2 (; ) and  < ~")
>

~"  
2(1 + g)
  1 + g
g(g   `)

`
1 + g
 

1 +
2~"(1  ~")`
1 + g

~"

  21 + g
g

The values of ~"(~"  ), ~" and ~"2 are relatively smaller than ~" when ~" is close enough
to zero: lim~"!0
~"(~" )
~"
 lim~"!0 ~"~"  lim~"!0 ~"
2
~"
= 0. Therefore, if ~" is suciently small,
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then we have
~"  
2(1 + g)
  1 + g
g(g   `)

`
1 + g
 

1 +
2~"(1  ~")`
1 + g

~"

  21 + g
g

>

~"  
2(1 + g)
  1 + g
g(g   `)

`
1 + g
  21 + g
g


  1 + g
g

=
`
2(1 + g)2
~"  `
2(1 + g)2
  `
g
1
g   ` 
3(1 + g)
g

=
`
2(1 + g)2
~"  `
2(1 + g)2
  `
g
1
g   ` 
3(1 + g)
g

>
`
2(1 + g)2
~"  3

3(1 + g)
g   `

 > 0:
The last inequality follows from   . Hence, it has been proved that (Di; N i) is a
best response at state sDi .
Finally, we show that the equilibrium payo is greater than ". Considering 0 <
 <  < 1 and 0 <  < ^ < 1, we have the equilibrium payo V i as follows.
V i =
1
1   + ^
h
(1  ^)[(1  )  `  ] + (1  )w
i
>(1  ^)[(1  )  `  ] + (1  )w
=(1  ^)[(1  )  `  ] + ^(1  )w (by equality (5.14))
>(1  ^)[(1  )  `  ] + ^(1  )w
=w = 1  ~":
Proposition 5.1 has been proved.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyze an innitely repeated game with costly observation. Con-
cretely, we analyze a model in which each player can observe the other player's action
without noise if he incurs a cost. Otherwise, he observes nothing. Ben-Porath and
Kahneman (2003) and Miyagawa et al. (2003) analyze these class of innitely repeated
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games and show a sucient condition for folk theorems. That is, they show a su-
cient conditions for eciency results. Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) show that
folk theorem holds if communication is available. Miyagawa et al. (2003) show that a
sucient condition that a folk theorem holds when the monitoring cost is suciently
small. Innitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is one of the most interesting games.
However, the above two studies do not show a sucient condition for an eciency re-
sult in an innitely repeated prisoner's dilemma when communication is not available.
In this chapter, we show that an eciency result in an innitely repeated prisoner's
dilemma by constructing a sequential equilibrium when public randomization device
is available and the monitoring cost is suciently small.
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